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This paper surveys recent empirical studies on the economic impacts of immigration.  The survey
first examines the magnitude of immigration as an economic phenomenon in various host countries.
The second part deals with the assimilation of immigrant workers into host-country labor markets
and concomitant effects for natives.  The paper then turns to immigration's impact for the public finances
of host countries.  The final section considers emerging topics in the study of immigration.  The survey
particularly emphasizes the recent experiences of Northern Europe and Scandinavia and relevant lessons













International migration is a mighty force globally. Over 175m people, accounting for 3% of
world￿ s population, live permanently outside their countries of birth (UN 2002). At the start
of the new millennium, European migration patterns are very di⁄erent than those from even 50
years ago. Europeans emigrated heavily in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but today
the reception and assimilation of immigrants is a signi￿cant economic and social phenomenon in
many previous emigration countries. Altogether 27m foreign nationals lived in European Union
(EU15) countries in 2007, accounting for about 7% of the population. Figure 1 shows that most
of the recent population growth in Europe results from migration.
This paper surveys the economic impacts of immigration for host countries. Empirical
evidence is drawn from the older and extensive literature regarding traditional destination coun-
tries like the US and Canada. However, this review also emphasizes the recent experiences of
Northern Europe and Scandinavia; a central goal is to highlight studies and lessons that have
particular application within this region. Migrant ￿ ows to some European countries are now
of similar magnitude to ￿ ows to the US, and it is helpful to identify relevant lessons from the
experiences of the US and other traditional destination countries. Looking forward, the hetero-
geneity in recent European experiences and policy environments provides an excellent laboratory
for identifying immigration￿ s e⁄ects in a new setting.
Section 2 begins by describing recent European immigration patterns. Section 3 considers
immigrant assimilation in the labor markets of host countries, while Section 4 surveys evidence on
possible displacement e⁄ects for natives. Section 5 evaluates how immigration impacts the public
￿nances of host countries. This is of particular policy importance for Europe given its ageing
populations and ￿scal imbalances. Section 6 identi￿es new areas of study regarding immigration
that move beyond these traditional topics; examples include the e⁄ects of immigration on housing
markets, prices, and innovation. The ￿nal section concludes.1
2 European Migration Patterns
Immigration is now a prominent feature in the economic, social, and political landscape of
many European countries. In 2007, over 27m people living in EU15 countries were foreign
nationals. This ￿gure partially represented migration within the EU region, which accounted
1Interested readers should also consult classic surveys of immigration like Greenwood and McDowell (1986),
Borjas (1994, 1995a, 1999c), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Card (2005), and
Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2009). Some of these surveys provided formal theoretical backgrounds on the
economics of immigration that are touched upon very lightly in this paper. Zimmermann (1995) described the
history of EU migration.
1for approximately a third of total migration. The larger share was citizens of countries outside
of the EU25 area, which comprised two-thirds of migrants and 5% of the EU15 population. The
aggregate size of this foreign national population was larger than the US￿comparable stock.
Table 1 shows that the majority of these EU15 foreign nationals resided in large countries like
Germany, France, Spain, and the UK. Measured in terms of population shares, foreign nationals
were of comparable importance for many of the smaller economies in Northern Europe. The
mean population share of EU15 foreign nationals of 7% was similar to the US share. Smaller
and geographically-remote nations like Finland or Portugal tended to have below average shares.
Table 1 mostly presents Eurostat statistics that are based upon nationality status. De￿ning
immigrants through country of birth yields a similar picture, although some di⁄erences emerge.
Table 1 continues by documenting di⁄erences in the rate at which European countries grant
citizenship to migrants. Europe as a whole had substantially lower rates of citizenship acqui-
sition than the US. Northern European countries tended to have higher rates of citizenship
attainment relative to Southern Europe for migrants; this was especially true for Sweden and
the Netherlands. Immigration is an even larger force in these countries than statistics using
foreign nationals indicate. Likewise, the US immigrant population share in 2000 de￿ned through
country of birth was 11% versus 7% de￿ned through citizenship.
The directions of migrant ￿ ows are very asymmetric. A signi￿cant share of early migrants
moved from Europe to the US, Canada, and Australia. While migration into these countries
remains very strong, the composition of source countries changed substantially over the last 30
years or so. Most migrants to the US, for example, now come from Latin America and Asia
instead of Europe. This composition change of migration ￿ ows is also observed in Europe.
Table 2 presents the major source countries of immigration by host country for 1997. This
table considers legal migrants only; illegal migration would further increase the migrant share
coming from outside the OECD for most host countries. Composition shifts were quite dramatic
across Northern European countries with the largest immigrant population shares. Sweden, for
example, received most of its migrants from other Nordic countries until the late 1970s, but a
substantial portion of its recent immigration has been refugees. Germany has received large
in￿ ows from Turkey, while Moroccan immigrants were the largest share for the Netherlands.2
This broader pool of migrants has led to greater heterogeneity in immigrant traits. The US
case is best documented. Recent immigrants from Latin America tended to be less educated
than earlier European migrations to the US. Over 35% of high-school dropouts in the US were
foreign born in 2000 (calculation based on the Current Population Survey), far greater than the
2Germany also experienced in￿ ows in the 1990s of ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union that were
substantially larger than the listed immigration ￿ ows (e.g., Br￿cker and Jahn 2010). These in￿ ows are not
captured, however, by nationality surveys as citizenship was automatically granted to ethnically German migrants.
While typically preferred, surveys collecting country of birth are unfortunately not consistently available.
2overall immigrant population share. On the other hand, the US has recently received large ￿ ows
of highly-educated immigrants. Asian in￿ ows have been particularly important in science and
engineering sectors and account for the majority of the US￿1990s growth in these occupations.3
Heterogeneity in immigrant types is also an important dimension of European ￿ ows. Table
1 documents di⁄erences in the 2001 foreign national share of workers with primary/secondary or
tertiary educations. As discussed below, immigrants have weaker labor force participation rates
than natives, which generally leads to lower worker shares compared to population shares. This
is particularly evident in countries accepting more refugees and asylum seekers. Most highly-
educated immigrants originated from other European countries or the OECD more generally;
only a third came from developing countries. Despite these high-skilled in￿ ows, the majority of
recent immigrants to Europe had a lower level of education than natives.4
Looking forward, observers place alternating fear and hope in the role of immigration for
Northern Europe. These fears often relate to the perceived ￿scal and social strains that would
accompany the assimilation a large number of less-educated workers. Cultural and social cohe-
sion is also a central policy concern. These issues have been strongly debated in the lead up to
and evaluation of the integration of European labor markets following the accession of Eastern
European states beginning in 2004.5 These issues and concerns are increasingly focused on
expanding immigration from developing economies and the assimilation of refugees.
Other observers, however, hope that future immigration can partially rectify ￿scal imbalances
resulting from ageing populations. By 2015, Europe￿ s natural rate of population growth will
turn negative with deaths outnumbering births. Net migration to the region is expected to
maintain a positive overall growth rate for the region￿ s population until 2035, but thereafter
projected immigration is insu¢ cient to maintain a positive rate (Eurostat 2009). While many
observers conclude that immigrants cannot fully rectify these ￿scal and ageing imbalances (e.g.,
Freeman 2006, Feldstein 2006), it is clear that immigration will grow in importance for Europe
over the next 50 years (Coleman 2008). This is particularly true with respect to labor markets
and public ￿nances, to which this survey turns next.
3For example, Cervantes and Guellec (2002), Freeman (2006), Kerr (2007), and Kerr and Lincoln (2010).
4Recent work has begun to more systematically compare immigrants across countries. Antecol et al. (2003)
and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) provided studies of quality di⁄erences in immigrants across several non-European
countries. Europe is relatively under studied in this respect, with Alghan et al. (2010) an important exception.
5For example, IOM (1991), Layard et al. (1992), Coleman (1993), OECD (1998), Bauer and Zimmermann
(1999), Fertig and Schmidt (2001), and Boeri and Br￿cker (2005). Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) described
the modest initial migration.
33 Immigrant Assimilation in the Labor Market
This section and the next consider the impact of immigration on the labor market. The
choice to migrate is ￿rst analyzed, as di⁄erent motivations can yield distinctly di⁄erent economic
outcomes. Assimilation of immigrants into the host-country labor market over time in terms of
wages and employment is then discussed. The section closes with future research needs. The
next section surveys how immigrants a⁄ect the labor market outcomes of natives.
3.1 Migration Choices
People move across countries for many reasons. Economic theory most prominently highlights
the international labor mobility that descends from wage di⁄erences across countries. Likewise,
many students from developing economies migrate to advanced countries, for either short or
long durations, to study in the schools and universities of advanced countries (e.g., Borjas 2009).
Sadly, many migrations are also the result of hardships or oppressions, as the growth of refugees
in Northern Europe attests. The nature of the migration will impact education levels, ages, and
tenures of immigrants, and consequently their probable assimilation. When migrants have the
power to choose, the nature of the migration will also impact the host country selected.
Unfortunately, the causes and decision frameworks of immigration are signi￿cantly less stud-
ied empirically than the economic impacts of resulting ￿ ows. International questionnaires
provide some evidence of migrant rationales, particularly surrounding the choice of destination
country. Migrants frequently cite higher income levels, better personal safety, short distance to
home countries, and established immigrant networks as the main reasons for choosing their new
host countries. Econometric studies tend to support these conclusions, and the importance of
income di⁄erentials is also evident in comparisons of income or GDP levels between host and
source countries.6
This demand for entry meets with supply restrictions set by nations through immigration
quotas. Ruhs (2008) reviewed the considerations inherent in immigration policy with particular
application to the UK￿ s framework. His work noted that economics provides more powerful
lessons for the selection of migrants, due to factors reviewed next, than for levels of immigration
or the rights conferred to migrants. Lucas (2004) and Aydemir and Borjas (2007) compared
immigration policies in North America. Europe is understudied in this respect. Recent moves
towards more uniform policies by EU members, however, are an especially interesting topic for
future research.
6For example, Lucas (1975), Straubhaar (1986), Long et al. (1988), Faini and Venturini (1993), Zimmermann
(1995), Massey et al. (1998), IOM (1998), Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Hatton and Williamson (1998),
OECD (2000), Coppel et al. (2001), Munshi (2003), Mandor⁄ (2007), and Kerr (2008b).
43.2 Earnings Assimilation
The assimilation of immigrants into host-country labor markets is typically studied through a
comparison of wages and employment rates of immigrants versus natives at the time of entry
and over the duration of stay. Various studies have employed cross-sectional data, repeated
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where i indexes individuals and t indexes time. Immigration cohorts C, de￿ned through the year
of entry j, have separate intercept terms that are of direct interest. lnwit is the natural logarithm
of earnings of individual i in year t. Annual wages are often considered, or averages of hourly,
weekly, or monthly pay. Xit is a vector of individual characteristics that typically includes age,
education, region of residence, marital status, work experience, and language spoken.
Where several years of data are available, studies typically control for both years since migra-
tion (Y rsMig) and migrant cohort ￿xed e⁄ects C
j
i. The latter may be more broadly measured
using ￿ve-year intervals or similar. Year ￿xed e⁄ects can further control for aggregate wage
changes with repeated cross-sections or panel data. Variations in speci￿cation (1) exist across
studies, depending upon the emphasis of researchers, as one cannot identify cohort e⁄ects, time
period e⁄ects, time since migration, and immigrant age simultaneously at a detailed level.
The ￿rst studies in this vein found that US immigrants earned less than natives when entering
the country but converged to the native wage level in 15 years (e.g., Chiswick 1978; Carliner
1980). After 30 years, immigrants were found to earn more than natives of similar age and
education. These results led many to conclude that immigration had a positive net impact on
the US economy. A large debate subsequently emerged about whether more recent immigration
cohorts to the US were of lower education and skill due to a shift in source-country composition
after the 1965 Immigration Act. Particular concern focused on whether these newer cohorts
would integrate as well into the US economy.7
Table 3 surveys the wage studies on immigrant assimilation in Northern Europe. There are
a large number of studies concerning the US, of which Table 3 presents a subset for comparison.
Similar to the US, European immigrants typically earn less than natives at entry and over
time. These earnings gaps do vary greatly across countries and time, however, and some
groups of immigrants earn more than natives (e.g., Bell 1997, Grant 1999). Hence, the within-
country di⁄erences can be as large as between-country di⁄erences. It is usually found that
7Borjas (1985, 1995a, 1999b) and Yuengert (1994) were pessimistic with respect to recent cohorts, while
Chiswick (1986), LaLonde and Topel (1991), Card (2005), and Lubotsky (2007) were more optimistic. Borjas
(1993) and Baker and Benjamin (1994) considered the Canadian evidence.
5these earnings gaps are largely explained by lower education levels among immigrants, although
Clark and Drinkwater (2008) described the larger conditional gaps for immigrants from recent
accession countries to the UK. The latter occurs when highly educated migrants work in low
wage positions.
Beyond the levels of earnings gaps at entry, most studies agree that the earnings gap dimin-
ishes with time spent in the host country. Earnings assimilation happens as immigrants improve
their language skills or obtain more education (e.g., Chiswick 1991; Borjas 1994). There are sev-
eral studies on linguistic adjustment of immigrants8, including the important work of Dustmann
(1994), Dustmann and van Soest (2002), and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for Europe. Un-
fortunately, the relative importance of language skills in many contexts is di¢ cult to study due
to data constraints. The recent literature mostly concludes that immigrant-native wage gaps
diminish over the duration of stay but that permanent gaps nonetheless persist (e.g., LaLonde
and Topel 1992; Schoeni et al. 1996). Similar to the US, recent immigrant cohorts in most
European countries are not expected to achieve full convergence to native wage levels.
Proper accounting for re-migration is essential for determining the economic impacts for host
countries. Every fourth or third immigrant to the US permanently leaves the US at a later time.9
The available evidence suggests higher re-migration rates exist in Northern Europe. Edin et
al. (2000) found that 30%-40% of immigrants to Sweden left the country within ￿ve years of
arrival, and those who re-migrated were those who did not assimilate well into the Swedish labor
market. Constant and Massey (2003) and Bellemare (2003) found similar patterns in Germany.
These higher re-migration rates are not surprising given the geographical proximity of Northern
European nations to each other and to migrants￿home countries. They may also descend from
more challenging economic and cultural assimilation vis-a-vis traditional destination countries
like the US, although these determinants have not been systematically studied.
To the extent that re-migration is negatively selected￿ that is, those who re-migrate per-
formed worse in terms of assimilation￿ empirical estimates are apt to both overstate the eco-
nomic success that immigrants attain with duration of stay and overstate the expected costs of
immigration to society. They may also misjudge longitudinal changes in cohort quality. Recent
work highlights the potential biases that exist in studies using repeated cross-sections.
In a careful and credible study Lubotsky (2007) accounted for these e⁄ects using con￿dential
longitudinal data on immigrants from the US Census Bureau. He found that immigrant earnings
grew 10%-15% more over their ￿rst 20 years in the US compared to native workers. This
8For example, McManus et al. (1983), Evans (1986), Chiswick and Miller (1988, 1992, 1995), Robinson (1988),
and Tainer (1988).
9For example, Lubotsky (2007), Warren and Peck (1980), and Friedberg and Hunt (1995). Dustmann (1996,
2003) and Dustmann and Weiss (2007) provide models and evidence from Europe.
6convergence was only half of the achievement that would have been calculated o⁄ of repeated
cross-sections noted above. The selective emigration by immigrants with poor earnings in the US
led to a systematic overstatement of assimilation. Lubotsky (2007) also found that more recent
cohorts of US immigrants were of lower quality, but that the decline was less than originally
perceived.
The existing evidence suggests that less successful immigrants were more likely to re-migrate
from Northern European countries, too. The direction of this selection e⁄ect and the high
rates of re-migration would suggest that the Lubotsky (2007) critique holds for the existing
European evidence. Indeed, this study provides the strongest lessons of the US experience for
Europe going forward. Much more attention should be devoted to these re-migration decisions
that can seriously a⁄ect the estimation of assimilation pro￿les and other trends related to the
duration of stay. As a positive, the Northern Europe experiences can be particularly informative
regarding re-migration issues given the recent development of labor market datasets of su¢ cient
longitudinal quality in many Nordic countries to replicate the Lubotsky (2007) approach.
Another issue typically ignored by the assimilation studies are the actual mechanisms through
which earnings assimilation takes place. While it is interesting to know whether immigrants
close the earnings gap to the natives over time in the host country, that information does not
necessarily lead to any relevant policy conclusions. More important would be to understand
whether the observed assimilation is caused, for example, by improved language skills, education
obtained in the host country, or new networks and contacts developed during the stay. Many
of the potential assimilation mechanisms can be a⁄ected by policy measures and hence knowing
what helps migrants to do better over time can o⁄er valuable lessons for policy makers. For
example, many Scandinavian countries o⁄er language courses to new immigrants as part of their
assimilation training, but no evidence exists on the e⁄ectiveness of such training in terms of the
success of job search or improved earnings.
Finally, some debate exists about whether earnings assimilation depends on the economic
conditions that immigrants faced when entering the country￿ that is, a scarring e⁄ect due to
initial labor market experiences independent of immigrant quality. ¯slund and Rooth (2007)
found that immigrants to Sweden during the very severe 1990s recession still faced inferior wage
development seven years later. The evidence from the US and Canada on this is ambiguous.10
3.3 Employment Assimilation
European researchers and policy makers are particularly interested in the employment rates
of immigrants relative to natives. These outcomes are distinct from the wage di⁄erentials for
10For example, Nakamura and Nakamura (1994), Chiswick et al. (1997), McDonald and Worswick (1998), and
Chiswick and Miller (2005).
7employed immigrants discussed above. This European focus is due to both higher unemployment
rates in most European countries vis-a-vis the US over the past few decades and the greater
generosity of European unemployment bene￿ts systems. Long-term unemployment among
immigrants can be a much larger ￿scal burden for European public ￿nances than in the US.
Table 4 documents the relative employment rates of non-EU immigrants to natives across
European countries, taken from Angrist and Kugler (2003). Immigrants had both lower par-
ticipation rates and employment rates (conditional on participation). Similar to wages, gaps
in participation rates were substantially larger among more recent immigrants than earlier co-
horts. These di⁄erentials can again re￿ ect immigrant assimilation over time or deteriorations
in immigrant quality with recent cohorts. Recent in￿ uxes of refugees to Europe further lowered
relative participation rates due to restrictions on the initial ability of refugees to seek employ-
ment. Table 4 also shows that relative participation rates were lower among female immigrants,
perhaps partially due to cultural reasons.11
To characterize these e⁄ects more rigorously, most studies estimate an employment equation
akin to the wage equation (1). The dependent variable is usually an indicator variable for em-
ployment status, and linear probability or non-linear estimation techniques are utilized. Similar
to the wage debate, the employment results regarding US immigrants are con￿ icting. While all
researchers found large di⁄erences in employment rates at time of entry, some argued that these
gaps disappear after ten years (e.g., Chiswick et al. 1997) while others argued that permanent
gaps remain (e.g., Borjas 1995a,b). Most again believed that the employment rates of recent
immigrant cohorts will not converge completely to native rates.
Table 5 surveys further European evidence. The most important explanatory variable for
immigrant employment gaps tends to be source country. Taking the Swedish example, most
immigrants in the 1970s were from other Nordic countries and did not display weaker employment
rates than the native Swedes.12 The relative employment rates of immigrants, however, have
worsened with recent cohorts and greater numbers of refugees. Nekby (2002), for example, found
that migrants from other Nordic countries did well in the Swedish labor market, whereas those
from outside of Europe did worse. Nevertheless, relative employment rates of all immigrants
improved over the duration of their stay. Men and women who moved less than ￿ve years
ago were 44% and 48% less likely to be employed, respectively, but the gaps for both genders
declined to less than 15% after 20 years of stay.
As noted earlier, immigrant traits vary dramatically across source countries. It is likely that
11While most studies analyze the assimilation of immigrant men, foreign-born females are a sizeable share
of the labor force in many countries (e.g., 5% in the US). This lack of research is due in part to the weaker
labor market attachment of women, selection biases, and the resulting lack of wage information. This weaker
attachment, however, makes a study of female assimilation even more interesting and relevant to policy. Schoeni
(1998) surveys the labor market assimilation of immigrant women.
12For example, Ekberg (1991, 1999), Wadensj￿ (1997), Lundborg (2000), and Vilhelmsson (2000).
8the high explanatory power of source countries partly re￿ ects poor measurement of observable
characteristics like immigrant education, language ability, and work experience. It is also di¢ -
cult in practice to discern cohort e⁄ects from assimilation e⁄ects due to longitudinal limitations
in most immigration datasets. The recent growth of longitudinal datasets represents a genuine
opportunity to re￿ne these estimates and account for re-migration selection issues. One exam-
ple is Sarvim￿ki (2010), who found that many immigrant groups in Finland rapidly converged
towards native employment levels despite large initial employment gaps. Sarvim￿ki recognized
the e⁄ects of selective re-migration that limit most assimilation studies. The same criticism
pointed out by Lubotsky (2007) for the wage assimilation studies is also applicable here.
3.4 Conclusions and Future Research Opportunities
The surveyed evidence ￿nds that recent migration cohorts to Northern Europe are likely to
enter with reduced employment and earnings; over their durations of stay they will only achieve
partial convergence to native levels. Future research will mainly focus on the magnitudes of
these e⁄ects. As noted, proper accounting for re-migration is essential. Closer attention
is also needed on assimilation patterns under conditions of native population decline. The
studies above evaluated countries and periods undergoing population expansion, especially the
US studies. As Europe moves into an era of natural population and workforce decline, the
assimilation of immigrants may be di⁄erent from earlier experiences.
Second, the heterogeneity of immigrant experiences within countries is understudied. The
existing evidence suggests that assimilation is faster with greater education (e.g., Schoeni 1997).
More research is required into the speci￿cs of labor market assimilation for refugees, past asylum
seekers, and similar categories. As the migration is not motivated for employment reasons,
assimilation is likely to be slower and less successful. Indeed, many studies have not accounted
for the fact that some immigrant groups are not eligible to work in the host country, at least
not immediately upon arrival. This is particularly true for asylum seekers and the spouses
of migrants. Separate analyses of these groups would be warranted, as well as evaluations of
assimilation after the potential employment limitations have been removed. Understanding
better how cultural assimilation (e.g., Bisin et al. 2008) a⁄ects labor market assimilation is also
important.
Third, the mechanisms of wage and employment assimilation are poorly understood. Im-
migrants may face various obstacles to employment, including issues with the recognition of
educational degrees, lack of language skills, poor professional connections or networks, and regu-
lations that prevent them from working legally. These obstacles are not generally accounted for
in the assimilation studies. Furthermore, as these obstacles generally diminish during the stay in
9the host country, researchers should evaluate how it a⁄ects employment and wage assimilation.
A better understanding of the assimilation mechanisms would help in developing more relevant
policy recommendations.
Finally, recent research has begun to better document the assimilation of second-generation
immigrants. Card (2005) found that children of immigrants assimilated reasonably well into
the US labor market. This is encouraging as recent US cohorts will likely have persistent gaps
to the average native in both education levels and wages conditional on these traits. On the
other hand, Algan et al. (2010) did not ￿nd consistent evidence for strong second-generation
convergence in Germany, France, and the UK. Nor was there a clear link to the assimilation
policies of the countries studied. This remains an important frontier in immigration studies.
4 Displacement E⁄ects in the Labor Market
This section moves from immigrant assimilation to the e⁄ects of immigration on labor outcomes
of native workers. The conceptual framework is ￿rst presented, followed by a review of earnings
and employment displacement studies. As multiple high-quality surveys are devoted to the
extensive literature on displacement e⁄ects, this paper presents highlights most relevant for this
discussion. Interested readers should consult referenced surveys below for additional details.
4.1 Conceptual Framework
Immigration a⁄ects the wages of the host country in several ways. Abstracting from lower
participation rates, immigration increases the labor force of the receiving country. This growth
in labor supply a⁄ects average wages in the economy if other factors of production like capital are
￿xed due to changes in relative scarcities. Even if other factors of production adjust, this labor
growth directly a⁄ects the average wage due to simple composition e⁄ects if the distribution
of educations and skills of immigrants di⁄ers from the native population. For most European
economies, this composition e⁄ect has reduced the average wage as immigrants were of lower
average skill than native workers.
More interestingly, immigrants are also expected to lower the relative wages or employment
of natives for whom they are close substitutes. This decline is due to a change in the relative
supply of worker types. On the other hand, wages and employment of complementary workers
or factors of production may increase. These predictions follow directly from a standard labor
supply-demand framework. They are short-run predictions absent any changes in capital stocks,
industry mixes, and similar. Hence, the welfare of certain populations in the host country may
deteriorate even if the aggregate impact of immigration is positive.
10Accordingly, studies have sought to quantify e⁄ects for native groups viewed as particularly
at risk of displacement. Typical examples include high-school dropouts, previous immigrant
cohorts, and US scientists and engineers. Estimating these e⁄ects is quite challenging, however,
as substitutability has many dimensions (e.g., personal traits, spatial and time variation).
Most studies employ regional comparisons or, to a lesser extent, general equilibrium frame-
works. Regional studies typically compare labor markets in cities with high immigration ￿ ows
to those with smaller ￿ ows. While readily implementable, these studies face several challenges:
overcoming integration and spillovers across neighboring labor markets; small datasets with few
cities and years; and ignoring general equilibrium e⁄ects like price changes. These issues are
particularly acute in smaller countries with a few dominant cities. Card (2005) discussed this
approach in detail.
Alternatively, general equilibrium frameworks identify a single immigration event where a
clear comparison group exists. This focus helps isolate immigration￿ s e⁄ect from contempo-
raneous innovations in the labor market. The challenges, of course, are the identi￿cation of
suitable case studies and asserting the external validity of ￿ndings. Okkerse (2008) provided a
detailed survey of these techniques and related approaches.
4.2 Earnings Displacement E⁄ects
Immigrants tend to concentrate in certain regions of host countries, often the major cities.
For large nations like the US, geographical distances of cities to home countries also play an
important role. Immigrant networks from past migrations are important for location decisions,
although skilled and unskilled immigrants of the same nationality may sort di⁄erently across
cities in the host country.
A typical wage displacement study attempts to exploit this spatial heterogeneity across lo-
cations in an estimating equation of the form
lnwirt = ￿prt + ￿Xirt + ￿r + ￿t + "irt; (2)
where lnwirt is the natural logarithm of earnings of individual i in region r and year t. Xirt
includes controls for observable traits like education, experience, and appropriate interactions.
Panel ￿xed e⁄ects for regions and years are included. The regressor of interest, prt, is the
immigrant density in region r at year t, and ￿ captures the partial correlation between wages and
immigration density. This simple framework only considers region-year variation in immigrant
density, but the approach is readily extended to cells constructed by education, experience,
industry, occupation, or some combination of these.
11Table 6 catalogues several wage displacement studies. As the surveys of Borjas (1994)
and Friedberg and Hunt (1995) provided excellent summaries of wage displacement e⁄ects until
the early 1990s, this survey concentrates on more recent studies and European experiences.
The table reports estimated wage elasticities. These elasticities are often calculated for a
particular worker population, and the impact on at-risk groups should not be generalized to the
population level. Comparisons across studies are challenged by di⁄erences in how narrow or
wide this population subsample is; they are also challenged by studies alternatively examining
numbers of immigrants versus their share in the labor force. Nonetheless, broad patterns of this
phenomenon are evident.
The documented wage elasticities are small and clustered near zero. Dustmann et al. (2008)
likewise found very little evidence for wage e⁄ects in their review of the UK experience. This
parallels an earlier conclusion by Friedberg and Hunt (1995) that immigration had little impact
on native wages; overall, their survey of the earlier literature found that a 10% increase in the
immigrant share of the labor force reduced native wages by about 1%. Recent meta-surveys
by Longhi et al. (2005, 2008) and Okkerse (2008) found comparable, small e⁄ects across many
studies.
This consistent ￿nding of small e⁄ects has led to many additional e⁄orts to understand its
origin. Several studies assess whether endogenous location decisions by immigrants weaken
displacement. One strand uses natural experiments of major, exogenous immigration waves
to a region: the Card (1990) study of the 1980 Mariel boatlift from Cuba to Miami, the Hunt
(1992) study of the 1962 repatriation of European-origin Algerians to France upon Algeria￿ s
independence, and the Friedberg (2001) study of Russian Jewish immigration to Israel in 1990-
2004. These studies found very weak e⁄ects after these events despite increases of up to 10%
of the local labor force. These types of studies are generally credible, especially if they can
demonstrate external validity of results. A second strand uses an interaction of past immigrant
stocks and migration trends to instrument for observed local changes.13 These estimations again
￿nd comparable results.
Other work focuses on whether economic integration across cities dampens the measured
e⁄ects (e.g., Borjas et al. 1992, 1997). Potential out-migration from cities by natives due to
immigration could counteract changes in relative supply. Card and DiNardo (2000), Card (2001),
and Peri (2007a) found this to be very small in the US context, although Partridge et al. (2008)
found out-migration important for immigration￿ s impact on rural counties. Likewise, Card and
Lewis (2007) found that industry adjustment across US cities in response to immigration is very
small.
13For example, Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001), Peri (2007a), Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), and
Kerr and Lincoln (2010).
12Despite this success, Angrist and Krueger (1999) stressed that researchers must be very
careful about assessing the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences assumptions embodied in (2). They, for ex-
ample, show di⁄erent labor market trends among seemingly comparable cities in a falsi￿cation
exercise for a potential Mariel boatlift in 1994 that was diverted at the last minute. Fu-
ture studies of similar nature should therefore consider demonstrating external validity through
these types of falsi￿cation exercises. Lewis (2010) provided evidence that technology choice
and capital-skill complementarity can explain some of the limited ￿ndings in area-based studies.
Aydemir and Borjas (2011) also highlighted the role that sampling error can play in immigration
analyses.
Borjas (2003) provided the strongest criticism of regional studies and their limited displace-
ment e⁄ects. Borjas argued that the US comprised a national labor market. Looking within
cohort-schooling-experience cells, Borjas found large, negative wage e⁄ects due to immigration.
He measured that a 10% increase in immigrant labor supply reduced native weekly earnings
by 3%-4%. Much of the recent literature has debated these methodologies and ￿ndings, with
particular emphasis on how substitutable immigrant and native workers are.14 A second debate
is about the extent to which labor markets are national versus local in nature. Also, if a third
factor (such as skill biased technological change) a⁄ects the wage structure at the same time
when large numbers of less skilled immigrants enter the host country, this could bias estimates
of the extent to which immigration causes native wage displacement e⁄ects.
The displacement evidence collected for Europe is comparable to the US, although most
European studies do not exploit natural experiments or other experimental settings. European
studies are generally based on large in￿ uxes of immigrants into a speci￿c country at a speci￿c
point in time, and the estimates could perhaps be characterized as descriptive rather than causal.
Most studies have examined the German experience, typically ￿nding only small wage e⁄ects
despite large immigration volumes.15 Impacts can again be di⁄erent across native groups.
DeNew and Zimmermann (1994b) found that unskilled wages in Germany declined as a result
of immigration in the 1980s, whereas skilled wages increased. D￿ Amuri et al. (2010) found
that the wage and employment displacement e⁄ects from 1990s immigration to Germany were
concentrated among the immigrants themselves, with little impact for natives. In a strong
recent paper, Br￿cker and Jahn (2010) built a general equilibrium model that allowed wage
setting. They concluded that a 1% increase in the German labor force through immigration
reduced wages by 0.1%, an elasticity comparable to the area-based studies in the US. Their
long-run analysis suggested signi￿cant capital adjustment as well, so that average wages did not
permanently decline.
14For example, Peri (2007a), Ottaviano and Peri (2008, 2010), Cortes (2008), and Borjas et al. (2008).
15For example, Bauer (1998), Pischke and Velling (1994), and Winter-Ebmer and Zimmermann (1998).
13The small wage elasticities also appear to hold for other European countries. One reason
for small wage e⁄ects in Europe may be that immigrants do not usually ￿nd work immediately.
As discussed earlier, a large share of immigrants remains outside the labor force upon arrival.
Second, the recent US work emphasizes the extent to which immigrants and natives are substi-
tutes. While comparative assessments do not exist, it seems likely that immigrants will be less
substitutable in many European countries than in the US (e.g., greater language di⁄erences).16
4.3 Employment Displacement E⁄ects
Table 7 catalogues a second set of European studies that consider possible employment dis-
placement e⁄ects for natives by immigration (e.g., Zimmermann 1994). Similar to wages, there
is little evidence for adverse employment e⁄ects, although Borjas (2003, 2009) did ￿nd very
large displacement e⁄ects. The meta-survey by Longhi et al. (2006) concluded that limited
employment displacement has occurred. Interestingly, they found evidence that employment
displacement was more likely in Europe than in the US, and that to some degree employment
displacement substituted for wage displacement. These di⁄erences, however, were small and
not statistically precise.
Some European studies have also evaluated native unemployment rates, which can be more
di¢ cult to compare across countries. Theory also does not predict directly how rates of un-
employment and employment will react (e.g., Friedberg and Hunt 1995). These studies again
do not point to a signi￿cant trend. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) calculated that native un-
employment in the EU15 will increase by 0.2% if immigrants￿share in the labor force increases
by 1%. Gross (2002) argued that immigration would reduce France￿ s long-run unemployment
even if unemployment increased in the short run. Br￿cker and Jahn (2010) concluded that a
1% increase in the German labor force through immigration raised unemployment by less than
0.1%. This latter ￿nding is particularly striking given the size of the German immigration and
the similar ethnic origins of the immigrants.
4.4 Conclusions and Future Research Opportunities
The displacement literature is vast, and this paper has only touched on major points. The
large majority of studies suggest that immigration does not exert signi￿cant e⁄ects on native
16Additional research attempts to quantify the comprehensive e⁄ect of immigration on the wages or employment
of natives. This work combines elasticities, which are most directly transferable across countries, with levels of
immigration. For example, Jaeger (1996) argued that US immigration in the 1980s reduced the real wages of high-
school dropouts by 3%, or a third of the change during the decade. Card (2001) estimated that immigration
to gateway US cities has reduced wage levels by 1%-3% or less. In a scenario of massive Eastern European
immigration, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) calculated that Western European wages would decline by at most
0.8%.
14labor market outcomes. Even large, sudden in￿ ows of immigrants were not found to reduce
native wages or employment signi￿cantly. E⁄ects that do exist tend to be relatively small and
concentrated among natives or past immigrants that are close substitutes (e.g., Okkerse 2008).
Overall, the limited substitutability of immigrants for natives in many European economies
would suggest that displacement e⁄ects are likely to be small. It should be noted, however, that
researchers are continuing to debate and re￿ne the methodologies put forth by Borjas (2003)
that ￿nd larger impacts.
While large, economy-wide displacement e⁄ects appear unlikely, it is still possible that spe-
ci￿c sectors or population groups experience signi￿cant impacts from immigration. Studies
evaluating the potential displacement e⁄ects for the at-risk groups or sectors, especially those
with strong empirical identi￿cation, would still have a place in the vast displacement literature.
Cross-country comparisons within Europe o⁄er a great opportunity to re￿ne these assess-
ments. In particular, appropriately aligned data would allow a comparison of national labor
market approaches and area-based studies. The integration of datasets and country experi-
ences could also allow simultaneous analysis of e⁄ects on sending and receiving countries (e.g.,
Chiquiar and Hanson 2005). Moreover, this setting allows for a comparison across countries in
terms of policy environments. For example, Angrist and Kugler (2003) found that European
labor market rigidities exacerbated the negative impact of immigration on native employment.
These labor market rigidities include, for example, centralized wage setting that does not allow
for downward wage adjustment and restrictive employment protection laws. The move towards
common policies with the integration of EU labor and product markets could potentially of-
fer empirical footholds for causal assessments that have generally not been performed in the
European displacement studies.
5 Immigration and Public Finances
This section turns to immigration￿ s e⁄ects on the public ￿nances of host countries. The ￿rst
part analyzes the use of social bene￿ts by immigrants; the second part studies the net ￿scal
e⁄ects of immigrants over their lifetimes. This area has been less studied and reviewed than
the work on labor markets, but this is of central importance for European economies given the
stronger social bene￿ts provided compared to the US.
5.1 Immigrants and Social Bene￿ts
A crucial determinant of the economic impact of immigration on the host country is the amount
of welfare services and other social bene￿ts that immigrants consume. Weaker employment
15prospects may lead immigrants to depend more on social security and similar programs than
natives. Moreover, social security programs in host countries are often more generous than in
immigrants￿homelands. Borjas (1999a) and others have discussed possible "welfare magnet
e⁄ects" where migrants are drawn to countries with high social bene￿ts. This section reviews
empirical work on immigrants￿use of social bene￿ts in the US, Canada, and Northern Europe.
The US studies discussed below were exceptionally in￿ uential, resulting in policy changes that
reduced the welfare services available to immigrants.
The earliest US studies concluded that immigrant families used social bene￿ts less frequently
than otherwise similar American families; conditional on use, the intensity of bene￿ts were
similar (e.g., Blau 1984; Tienda and Jensen 1986). These studies used cross-sectional data
from 1976 and 1980, respectively, and hence were unable to identify di⁄erences across migrant
cohorts from changes in welfare use over duration of stay. More recent studies have relied
on repeated cross-sections or panel data to disentangle assimilation e⁄ects. Table 8 surveys
di⁄erences in the probability of social bene￿ts use by immigrants relative to natives, and whether
immigrants assimilate into or out of welfare. As an example, immigrants are reported to be
100% more likely to be welfare users if 10% of native families and 20% of immigrant families use
social bene￿ts. Thus, larger apparent di⁄erences can emerge vis-a-vis wage and employment
estimations, especially if absolute use of bene￿ts by natives is small. Most studies consider
frequency of use; di⁄erences in intensity of use can raise or lower the estimated dependency.
Borjas and Trejo (1991) found that immigrants￿use of social bene￿ts in the US increased
dramatically in the 1970s. This was mainly due to the weaker labor market status of new
immigrant cohorts in the 1960s. Moreover, in contrast to earlier work, immigrants appeared
to increase their use of social bene￿ts with duration of stay. Assimilation into welfare may
be due to improved knowledge of social institutions of the host country or the ending of legal
restrictions on welfare use during the initial years of stay. Hu (1998) also emphasized that older
US immigrants used proportionally more social bene￿ts than younger immigrants (in relative
comparison to natives of similar ages). Table 8 shows Hu￿ s calculations for age groups 18-64,
but she also found that bene￿ts use by immigrants over 55 years old increased from 18% to
64% in 1980￿ 1990. The main determinant of bene￿ts use was age at entry, and newer cohorts
were found to use social bene￿ts more than previous cohorts throughout the age distribution.
Education, language pro￿ciency, and labor market success were also important determinants of
welfare use.
Concerning the amount of social support received, Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) concluded
that immigrant males both use social bene￿ts less frequently and receive smaller amounts than
natives. The only bene￿t they used more was food stamps (10% of the total). Immigrant women
were more likely than natives to be on welfare and particularly social security; they received about
1610% more support than natives. Gustman and Steinmeier calculated that immigrant men by
retirement pay 76% of the taxes a comparable native male, but receive in pensions and social
security 83% of the amount natives receive. The shares for women are more equal at 78% and
80%, respectively. Yet, larger di⁄erences again exist for later cohorts. Borjas and Trejo (1991)
calculated that the average immigrant family costs $13.5k for the welfare system over the course
of their US stay, compared to the $7.9k cost of a native family.
Baker and Benjamin (1995) found the Canadian experience to be somewhat di⁄erent. Immi-
grants, apart from refugees, consumed less unemployment bene￿ts, social security, and housing
support than natives. They also found that immigrants assimilated towards higher bene￿t in-
cidence with duration of stay, a result that Crossley et al. (2001) later disputed. Crossley et
al. also did not ￿nd evidence that more recent cohorts were more likely to be on unemployment
insurance or social assistance than earlier cohorts. They concluded that estimates from cohort
￿xed-e⁄ects models were very sensitive to the choice of survey years. The fact that the Cana-
dian results were so sensitive to the selection of immigrant cohorts and observation years speaks
against relying on small data sets, especially those with only cross-sectional information or few
time-series observation points, for making conclusions on behavioral changes and trends over
time spent in the host country. Their results also argue for careful speci￿cation selection and
caution when using ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cations that rely on the common time e⁄ect assumption
to identify the e⁄ect of "years since migration".
Immigrants in most European countries rely more on social security and unemployment
bene￿ts relative to natives than in the US or Canada. Nordic countries enjoy the advantage
of having access to population level data over longer periods of time. Despite the high data
quality, most of the Nordic studies are not concerned with causal identi￿cation or issues such
as selective re-migration, instead being more descriptive in nature. Sweden and Denmark are
the most studied Nordic countries. Immigrants in these countries are 2-3 times more likely
to be below the poverty line than natives, and Blume et al. (2003) found that disparities in
immigrant-to-native poverty rates increased from the mid 1980s to late 1990s.17 Immigrants
received over 18% of social bene￿ts in Denmark in 1999, even though their population share was
less than 3% (Blume and Verner 2007). B￿chel and Frick (2005) calculated that social bene￿ts
were the major income source for 40% of the Danish immigrant population, ￿ve times higher
than the native rate.
Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) took a deeper look at the causes of greater welfare reliance by
immigrants and found that recent Swedish immigrants used relatively more social security than
17Approximately 10% and 15% of native Danes and Swedes, respectively, were below the poverty line at the end
of the 1990s. This compared to every third immigrant in Denmark and every fourth immigrant in Sweden being
below the line. The comparable US share for immigrants varies between 6% and 37% depending on migrant
ethnicity (Borjas 1990). The Canadian share is between 8% and 32% (Kazemipur and Halli 2001).
17they did in the 1980s; they traced this increase to changes in the volume and composition of
migrant ￿ ows and higher overall unemployment rates. In order to develop more useful policy
recommendations they evaluate whether welfare usage is related to employability or preferences.
They ￿nd that di⁄erences in observable traits do not explain the gap in welfare take-up rates
between immigrants and natives. Immigrants assimilate out of welfare in both Denmark and
Sweden (Hansen and Lofstrom 2003, Blume and Verner 2007), but permanent di⁄erences exist
between immigrants and natives. Immigrants are 5%-8% more likely to receive social bene￿ts
than natives after 20 years of stay, which is comparable to the 5%-7% di⁄erences measured for
the US and Canada (e.g., Borjas and Hilton 1996; Baker and Benjamin 1995).
In a pan-European analysis, B￿chel and Frick (2005) emphasized the considerable di⁄erences
that exist across European countries. Immigrants used social bene￿ts much more than natives
in Denmark, but relative usage levels were more similar in other countries. Most importantly,
this study found that controlling for immigrant characteristics did not dramatically change this
European heterogeneity. The higher bene￿t usage thus results more from policy and institutional
di⁄erences across countries than the characteristics of migrants. Barrett and McCarthy (2008)
further described the ambiguity in experiences regarding welfare usage by immigrants.
One issue with many of the welfare assimilation studies is the lack of separation between
welfare eligibility and usage. In particular, most studies do not evaluate the extent to which var-
ious immigrant groups are eligible to work and/or to receive welfare bene￿ts in the host country.
Changes in work eligibility over time might o⁄er interesting insights in the reasons for the greater
reliance on welfare by the immigrants. Similar to the wage and employment assimilation studies,
welfare assimilation studies also su⁄er from the issue of selective re-migration that generally has
not been accounted for. In addition, none of the studies have estimated the extent to which
welfare dependence is related to the "welfare magnet" e⁄ects versus employment obstacles such
as discrimination, insu¢ cient language skills, transferability of educational degrees and lack of
work permits.
5.2 Aggregate Impact on Public Finances
The evidence thus suggests that immigrants are more likely to use social bene￿ts than natives in
many Northern European countries. A central policy question is whether immigration burdens
the host country￿ s social bene￿ts system, welfare services, education system, and health care
sector more than is covered by the taxes paid by the immigrants (OECD 2000). This impact
of migration for European public ￿nance is particularly important given the predicted ￿scal
imbalances that will result from Europe￿ s ageing populations. A number of studies evaluate
the ￿scal impacts of immigration, often concluding that the total economic impact on the host
18country is relatively small. These calculations are very di¢ cult, however, and it should be
emphasized that the estimates can vary substantially depending on assumptions, econometric
methods, discounting techniques, and data employed (Coppel et al. 2001, Rowthorn 2008).
These challenges are summarized below.
There are two main techniques for evaluating the economic impact of immigration on public
sectors. The ￿rst tradition employs a simple "immigration surplus method". This technique
estimates a percentage GDP gain due to the growth in the supply of workers resulting from
immigration. The technique has an intuitive derivation from a constant returns model and
builds on the elasticity of demand for substitutes.18 The second approach applies generational
accounting methods (e.g., Auerbach and Kotliko⁄ 1987). This work estimates the total costs
and bene￿ts to the national economy caused by natives and immigrants, taking into account that
these costs and bene￿ts vary greatly by stage of life. The calculation is based on assumptions
about the taxes immigrants pay over their lifetime, the public goods and services (including
social bene￿ts) they consume, and how long they live in the host country. The total economic
impact is the discounted di⁄erence between tax payments and income transfers received for an
immigrant over the duration in the host country.
The earliest studies on ￿scal e⁄ects of immigration for the US yielded con￿ icting results.
Passel and Clark (1994) calculated that immigrants paid $27b more in taxes than the bene￿ts
they derived from the US social and education systems. By contrast, Huddle (1993) argued that
immigrants represented an annual net cost of $40b in 1992. Borjas (1995a) criticized the earlier
studies for making unreasonable assumptions. He estimated the net impact of immigration
to range from a $16b cost to a $60b bene￿t depending on the assumptions made. This work
highlighted the sensitivity of ￿scal estimates to the methods employed. In a later study, Borjas
(2001) argued that the positive e⁄ects of immigration are created by improved labor market
e¢ ciency, with gains accruing to natives between $5b and $10b. More recent US studies have
calculated that the average net cost or bene￿t of a single immigrant is very small.19
In perhaps the most relevant study from the US, Storesletten (2000) calculated that one
immigrant provides a net bene￿t of only $7.4k over his lifetime. More importantly, Storesletten
also modelled the large heterogeneity across migrant groups. Highly-educated immigrants pro-
vide new human capital, often succeed in the US labor market, and pay more in taxes than they
use in public goods and services. Uneducated and elderly immigrants tend to cause large net
economic costs to society. The calculated di⁄erences can be striking, ranging from a net $36k
cost to $96k bene￿t depending upon the education level of the migrant. Storesletten (2000) also
noted that family migration may reduce the estimated bene￿ts of immigration. A typical ￿gure
18For example, Borjas (1995a), Freeman (2006), and Drinkwater et al. (2007).
19For example, Lee and Miller (2000), Smith and Edmonton (1997), Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999), and
Storesletten (2000).
19of the discounted social net value by migrant age is given in Figure 2. The ￿gure demonstrates
that even though migrants initially represent a net cost to the society, this cost is smaller and
lasts a much shorter time than the initial cost of a newborn native that has to be schooled.
Indeed, by comparison, a newly-born native represented a discounted net cost of $80k. As the
initial societal cost of newborn natives is so great, immigrants in their 20s and 30s are attractive
from a ￿scal perspective.
The generational accounting studies (such as Storesletten, 2000) typically ignore the impact
of immigrants on the natives, including any wage and employment displacement e⁄ects. Based
on the modest impacts found in the displacement literature discussed above, this may not be
such a great omission, but should certainly be recognized in each study. Despite this omission,
Storesletten (2000) provides one of the most careful and credible calculations of the total ￿scal
cost of immigration.
External validity is always a concern for immigration studies given the unique circumstances
of each country. This is certainly true for ￿scal impacts, as most European countries have
a much larger public sector than the US. Public expenditures in the US account for about
36% of GDP, whereas the European average is 48%. This higher public share likely increases
the European costs of immigration, as most public goods are consumed proportionately by
natives and immigrants. Moreover, immigrants have had less success in European labor markets
compared to the US, which reduces the realized economic bene￿ts of immigration.
Storesletten (2003) repeated his earlier analysis for Sweden and estimated that the average
immigrant to Sweden represented a net cost of e20k for the public sector, but the variation
across di⁄erent groups of immigrants was very wide. Young immigrants produced a net gain
of e24k, whereas immigrants over the age of 50 represented a large net cost. The results again
depended greatly on how the immigrants fared in the labor market. It is therefore crucial to
evaluate the labor market success in terms of participation and employment rates as discussed
earlier. Gustafsson and ￿sterberg (2001) found that more recent immigrants and refugees had
weaker labor market attachment and caused much higher costs than immigrants who had been
in Sweden for more than ￿ve years.
Policy studies of the Netherlands reached similar conclusions to the Swedish experience.
Roodenburg et al. (2003) also found that the ￿scal net e⁄ects varied greatly by immigrant
group but that the average impact remained small. Those who immigrated at a young age
or came from a western society produced a net gain, but all other groups represented a net
￿scal cost. Moreover, the authors found immigration bene￿ted capital owners. Knaap et al.
(2003) supported these conclusions: even if all immigrants had the same level of education as the
average native, the net ￿scal bene￿t was only marginal. In reality, immigrants had much lower
average education levels, so the possible bene￿ts were also lower. The pessimistic view was a
20result of the extensive public expenditure on goods and services. Immigrants were calculated
as consumers of these services whether or not they paid taxes.
Turning to Germany, a policy study by Sinn and Werding (2001) concluded that immigration
represented a net ￿scal burden to Germany, at least in 1997, even though long-term immigrants
who stayed over 25 years produced a net surplus. Bonin et al. (2000) and Bonin (2001) argued
that immigrants yield a small net bene￿t for the public sector over their whole lifespans due to
their young average arrival age and the manner through which the German pension system was
tied to earned income. Moscarola (2003) and Ablett (1999) similarly estimated that Italy and
Australia, respectively, bene￿ted from the taxes paid by immigrants relative to the cost they
represent.
It should be noted that the above studies make various assumptions about how public ex-
penditures on goods such as national defense and infrastructure are divided among natives and
immigrants. It is often assumed that pure public goods are produced regardless, so that the
consumption of a single immigrant does not increase expenditures. Other studies assumed that
both natives and immigrants consume equal amounts of such public goods. Rowthorn (2008)
reviewed these di⁄erences and concluded that in the great majority of countries the net ￿scal
impact was, positive or negative, less than 1% of GDP.
5.3 Conclusions and Future Research Opportunities
Research on the role of immigrants in the labor market mostly yields consistent ￿ndings across
countries and experiences: recent migrants have lower earnings than natives, there is partial
convergence with duration of stay, displacement e⁄ects tend to be small, the most a⁄ected groups
are close substitutes, etc. The literature on public ￿nances does not allow as many de￿nitive
conclusions. It is clear that recent immigrants to Northern Europe are likely on average to use
more social bene￿ts than natives, especially in the case of refugees. Likewise, it is very clear
that the net social impact of an immigrant over his or her lifetime depends substantially and in
predictable ways on the immigrant￿ s age at arrival, education, reason for migration, and similar.
But strong conclusions on other dimensions are not forthcoming. Studies ￿nd con￿ icting ev-
idence on whether immigrants increase or reduce social bene￿t usage with duration of stay. The
estimated net ￿scal impact of migrants also varies substantially across studies, but the overall
magnitudes relative to the GDP remain modest. This variance is partly due to di⁄erent settings
and policies, but also due to di⁄erences in methodology and assumptions. The more credible
analyses typically ￿nd small ￿scal e⁄ects. It is likely that most future research in this area will
continue to evaluate the ￿scal impacts of immigration on a country-speci￿c basis. Interesting
21comparisons might be provided by countries that traditionally have had a very selective migra-
tion policy, especially to the extent that they have been able to attract the most economically
pro￿table immigrants.
Two future research areas for public ￿nances and immigration are return migration and remit-
tances. Calculations of ￿scal impacts often assume that immigrants remain in the host country
after arrival; use of services and taxes paid are estimated through cross-sectional patterns. Go-
ing forward, these calculations need to consider more Europe￿ s high rates of return migration
and the selective out￿ ow based upon assimilation. This would provide a better estimate of the
mean e⁄ect and also characterize the heterogeneity in immigrant types. Likewise, the rapid
growth in remittances can a⁄ect public ￿nances. Many foreign workers transfer money to their
home countries, and the World Bank estimated total ￿ ows of about $300b in 2008. Carling
(2008) described European patterns. To the extent that remittances remove demand from the
host country, some ￿scal bene￿ts of migrants weaken.
6 Emerging Areas of Immigration Research
The literatures on how immigration a⁄ects the labor markets and public ￿nances of host countries
are the most developed. This survey closes by highlighting several areas of new research that
should be extended to the European context.
The ￿rst focuses on how immigrants impact housing prices and rents. Saiz (2003, 2007)
showed that US housing prices rise with immigration at the city level. Moreover, the elasticity is
about one, or ten times larger than that found in comparable labor market studies.20 Evaluations
of immigration and housing prices within Europe would help collaborate and extend these US
￿ndings. The estimated elasticities may even be stronger, for example, due to limited building
space in small countries vis-a-vis the US. Gonzalez and Ortega (2009) ￿nd a similar e⁄ect in
Spain, calculating that immigration could account for a third of Spain￿ s recent housing boom.
This would suggest enormous e⁄ects of immigration on the economy through a very understudied
channel.
Other research shows, however, that the general e⁄ect of immigration on price levels is
ambiguous. Similar to housing, aggregate demand for consumer goods in the short run grows
with a larger population. If supply adjusts slowly, with housing being a prominent example,
then short-run prices are likely to increase. Yet, immigrants may also a⁄ect the composition
of consumers. Lach (2007) studied the massive in￿ ow of Russian Jewish immigrants into Israel
20On the other hand, Saiz and Wachter (2010) found that growth in immigrants at the neighborhood-level
within cities was associated with lower housing price appreciation.
22in the early 1990s, and evaluated their impact on store level prices of consumer price index
goods. He found that even in the short-run immigrants resulted in lower and more uniform
prices because the immigrants had a greater demand elasticity and lower search costs than the
existing population. This contrast to the housing studies is very interesting.
Related, recent work quanti￿es how the supply of immigrant employment a⁄ects relative price
levels across goods (and thus the consumption bundles of natives). Cortes (2008) found that a
10% increase in the share of low-skill immigrants in the labor force at the US city level decreased
the price of immigrant-intensive services by 2%. Prominent examples included housekeeping and
gardening. This reduction was primarily through lower wages paid to immigrants. Her work
built o⁄ of a small open economy model, and examining comparable e⁄ects across European
economies would be very interesting. Frattini (2008) provided recent, comparable evidence
from the UK. The variations in immigrant types across European economies would also provide
empirical traction into separating the mechanisms behind these e⁄ects (e.g., refugees who are
restricted from work but purchase goods and services). They are also important inputs into
better general equilibrium frameworks along the tradition of Greenwood and Hunt (1995).
A ￿nal area of work investigates the role of immigrants in US innovation (e.g., Stephan and
Levin 2001). Immigrants represented 24% and 47% of the US science and engineering (SE)
workforce with bachelor￿ s and doctorate educations in the 2000 Census, respectively. This
contribution was signi￿cantly higher than the 12% share of immigrants in the US working pop-
ulation. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) calculated that immigrant SE workers accounted for more
than half of the net increase in the US SE labor force since 1995. Several studies further con-
nect high-skill immigration to growth in innovation by city or state.21 The available evidence
suggests that this is mainly due to high-skill immigrants being more involved in SE (e.g., Hunt
2010), with limited evidence of crowding-out of natives. However, mirroring to some extent the
wage displacement studies discussed earlier, Borjas (2009) argued that native displacement from
SE Ph.D. ￿elds occurred due to immigration.
Within the European context, most papers have analyzed the extent to which high-skilled
natives emigrate and to where (e.g., Saint-Paul 2004, Constant and D￿ Agosto 2008). Less
studied are the directions of ￿ ows within Europe, and the role of universities and R&D spending
by countries in shaping these patterns. The Hunter et al. (2009) study of the migration of
prominent physicists is an important step in this direction. Likewise, the impact of location on
productivity is just being discerned (e.g., Kahn and MacGarvie 2009). Given higher rates of
return migration from the US, these issues will continue to grow in importance.22
21For example, Peri (2007b), Kerr and Lincoln (2010), and Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010).
22The broader literature on the "brain drain" e⁄ect typically focuses on non-European experiences. Lucas
(2005), Freeman (2006), and Kerr (2008a) provide further references.
237 Conclusions
The economic literature on migration is an evolving research tradition with strong relevance for
policy choices. This survey has presented recent ￿ndings on the economic impacts of immigration
for host countries, with particular emphasis on Northern European experiences. Immigration
levels and ￿ ows for some Northern European countries have a relative strength on par with
traditional destination countries like the US. These signi￿cant economic magnitudes, combined
with Europe￿ s ageing population, make immigration a ￿rst-order policy question and research
concern. Empirical lessons are drawn from several literature strands.
First, evaluations of immigrants￿success in host-country labor markets are often based on
comparisons of immigrant wages and employment to natives at the time of entry and over the
duration of the stay. While the US literature has concentrated on wages, more European
studies analyze employment assimilation. Typically, immigrants are found to experience lower
employment and wages than natives at entry. Even though these di⁄erences are likely to diminish
over the duration of a migrant￿ s stay, recent cohorts are expected to experience permanently
weaker labor market success. This is particularly clear in European countries.
The likelihood and magnitude of adverse labor market e⁄ects for natives from immigration
are substantially weaker than often perceived. Within the large empirical literature looking
at the e⁄ects of immigration on native employment and wages, most studies ￿nd only minor
displacement e⁄ects even after very large immigrant ￿ ows. On the other hand, some more
recent studies have found larger e⁄ects, and many studies note that the negative e⁄ects are
concentrated on certain parts of the native population. The parts of the population most
typically a⁄ected are the less-educated natives or the earlier immigrant cohorts￿ that is, those
who are the closest substitutes to the new immigrant ￿ ow currently experienced by Europe.
The survey next looked at social bene￿ts use by immigrants. As immigrants are more
often outside of the labor force or unemployed, it has been assumed that they spend more time
on welfare and other forms of social assistance compared to natives. This assumption is not
uniformly con￿rmed by the literature, however. Welfare dependency varies across immigrant
types in predictable ways, and the recent immigrants to many European countries are more
likely to use social assistance upon arrival. But countries di⁄er substantially on levels of use
and whether immigrants assimilate into or out of welfare. This is due primarily to policy and
institutional di⁄erences across nations.
Immigration is often viewed as a large ￿scal burden for European public ￿nances￿ or as a
possible saviour if correctly harnessed. This has been palpable in the recent political atmospheres
of France, Italy, and Germany, for instance. Most empirical studies, however, estimate the ￿scal
24impacts of immigration to be very small. There certainly exist large di⁄erences across migrant
groups in the costs and bene￿ts they cause for a host country; the net impact depends heavily
on the migrant￿ s age, education, and duration of stay. On average, immigrants appear to have
a minor positive net ￿scal e⁄ect for host countries. Of course, these bene￿ts are not uniformly
distributed across the native population and sectors of the economy.
The literature on the economic impacts of immigration has come a long way, making the-
oretical and empirical advances on multiple dimensions. This survey has sought to balance
the extensive research regarding the experiences of traditional host countries like the US with
more recent European studies. This balance is important given the substantial di⁄erences that
exist in European labor markets, welfare systems, and recent migration ￿ ows. Both literatures
aid in the development of appropriate immigration policies for European countries. Despite
persistent data constraints and econometric challenges, many of the short-run e⁄ects for labor
market outcomes and public ￿nances can be forecast reasonably well. Future research around
key factors like re-migration is essential so that long-term impacts are better understood.
25References
[1] Ablett J. (1999) Generational accounting in Australia, in Auerbach A. (ed.) Generational
Accounting around the World, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[2] Algan Y., Dustmann C., Glitz A. & Manning A. (2010) The economic situation of ￿rst-
and second-generation immigrants in France, Germany, and the UK, Economic Journal,
120, 4-30.
[3] Altonji J. & Card D. (1991) The e⁄ects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of
less-skilled natives, in Abowd J. & Freeman R. (eds.) Immigration, Trade and the Labor
Market, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[4] Angrist J. & Krueger A. (1999) Empirical strategies in labor economics, in Ashenfelter O.
& Card D. (eds.) The Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume III, North Holland.
[5] Angrist J. & Kugler A. (2003) Protective or counter-protective? Labor market institutions
and the e⁄ect of immigration on EU natives, Economic Journal, 113, 302-331.
[6] Antecol H., Cobb-Clark D. & Trejo S. (2003) Immigration policy and the skills of immi-
grants to Australia, Canada and the United States, Journal of Human Resources, 38, 1,
193-218.
[7] Arai M. & Vilhelmsson R. (2004) Immigrants￿and natives￿unemployment-risk: Produc-
tivity di⁄erentials or discrimination, Industrial Relations, 43, 3, 690-698.
[8] ¯slund O. & Rooth D-O. (2007) Do when and where matter? Initial labor market con-
ditions and immigrant earnings, Economic Journal, 117, 422-448 (see also Institute for
Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) Working Paper 2003:7).
[9] Auerbach A. & Kotliko⁄ L. (1987) Dynamic Fiscal Policy, Cambridge University Press,
New York.
[10] Auerbach A. & Oreopoulos P. (1999) Analyzing the ￿scal impact of U.S. immigration,
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 89, 176-180.
[11] Aydemir A. & Borjas G. (2007) Cross-country variation in the impact of international
migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States, Journal of the European Economic
Association, 5, 4, 663-708.
[12] Aydemir A. & Borjas G. (2011) Attenuation bias in measuring the wage impact of immi-
gration, Journal of Labor Economics, 29, 1, 69-113.
[13] Baker M. & Benjamin D. (1994) The performance of immigrants in the Canadian labor
market, Journal of Labor Economics, 12, 3, 369-405.
[14] Baker M. & Benjamin D. (1995) The receipt of transfer payments by immigrants to Canada,
Journal of Human Resources, 30, 4, 650-676.
[15] Barrett A. & McCarthy Y. (2008) Immigrants and welfare programmes: Exploring the
interactions between immigrant characteristics, immigrant welfare dependence, and welfare
policy, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 542-559.
[16] Bauer T. (1997) Lohne⁄ecte der Zuwanderung: Eine Empirische Untersuchung f￿r
Deutschland, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg.
26[17] Bauer T. (1998) Arbeitsmarkte⁄ekte der Migration und einwanderungspolitik: Eine
Analyse f￿r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Physica Verlag, Heidelberg.
[18] Bauer T. & Zimmermann K. (1999) Assessment of possible migration pressure and its
labour market impact following EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, IZA
Research Reports 3.
[19] Bell B. (1997) The performance of immigrants in the United Kingdom: Evidence from the
GHS, Economic Journal, 107, 333-344.
[20] Bellemare C. (2003) Economic assimilation and out migration of immigrants in West Ger-
many earnings, Discussion Paper 65, Tilburg University, Centre for Economic Research.
[21] Bisin A., Patacchini E., Verdier T. and Zenou Y. (2008) Are Muslim immigrants di⁄erent in
terms of cultural integration?, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 445-456.
[22] Blau F. (1984) The use of transfer payments by immigrants, Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 37, 2, 222-239.
[23] Blau F., Kahn L., Moriarty J. & Portela Souza A. (2003) The role of family in immigrants￿
labor market activity: An evaluation of alternative explanations, American Economic
Review, 93, 1, 429-447 (see also NBER Working Paper 9051).
[24] Blume K., Gustafsson B., Pedersen P. & Verner M. (2003) A tale of two countries: Poverty
among immigrants in Denmark and Sweden since 1984, in Borjas G. & Shorrocks T. (eds.)
International Migration and Asylum (see also WIDER Discussion Paper 36).
[25] Blume K. & Verner M. (2007) Welfare dependency among Danish immigrants, European
Journal of Political Economy, 23, 2, 453-471.
[26] Bodvarsson O. & Van den Berg H. (2009) The Economics of Immigration, Springer, Hei-
delberg.
[27] Boeri T. & Br￿cker H. (2005) Why are Europeans so tough on migrants?, Economic Policy,
20, 44, 629-703.
[28] Bonin H. (2001) Fiscale e⁄ecte der zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Eine generationsbi-
lanz, Finanzarchiv, 57, 1-21.
[29] Bonin H., Ra⁄elhueschen B. & Walliser J. (2000) Can immigration alleviate demographic
burden?, Applied Economics Quarterly, Supplement, 52, 127-156.
[30] Borjas G. (1985) Assimilation, changes in cohort quality and the earnings of immigrants,
Journal of Labor Economics, 3, 463-489.
[31] Borjas G. (1990) Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Economy,
Basic Books, New York.
[32] Borjas G. (1993) Immigration policy, national origin and immigrant skills: A comparison
of Canada and the United States, in Card D. & Freeman R. (eds.) Small Di⁄erences that
Matter, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
[33] Borjas G. (1994) Economics of immigration, Journal of Economic Literature, 32, 1667-
1717.
[34] Borjas G. (1995a) The economic bene￿ts from immigration, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 9, 2, 3-22.
27[35] Borjas G. (1995b) Immigration and welfare, 1970￿ 1990, Research in Labor Economics, 14,
251-280.
[36] Borjas G. (1999a) Immigration and welfare magnets, Journal of Labor Economics, 17,
607-637.
[37] Borjas G. (1999b) Heaven￿ s Door, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[38] Borjas G. (1999c) The economic analysis of immigration, in Ashenfelter O. & Card D.
(eds) Handbook on Labor Economics Vol. 3A, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[39] Borjas G. (2001) Does immigration grease the wheels of the labor market?, Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2001, 1, 69-134.
[40] Borjas G. (2003) The labor demand curve is downward sloping: Reexamining the impact
of immigration on the labor market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1335-1374.
[41] Borjas G. (2009) Immigration in high-skill labor markets: The impact of foreign students
on the earning of doctorates, in Freeman R. & Goro⁄ D. (eds.) Science and Engineering
Careers in the United States: An Analysis of Markets and Employment, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago (see also NBER Working Paper 12085).
[42] Borjas G., Freeman R. & Katz L. (1992) On the labor market impacts of immigration
and trade, in Borjas G. & Freeman R. (eds.) Immigration and the Work Force: Economic
Consequences for the United States and the Source Areas, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
[43] Borjas G., Freeman R. & Katz L. (1997) How much do immigration and trade a⁄ect labor
market outcomes?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1-90.
[44] Borjas G., Grogger J. & Hanson G. (2008) Imperfect substitution between immigrants and
natives: A reappraisal, Working Paper.
[45] Borjas G. & Hilton L. (1996) Immigrants and the welfare state: Immigrant participation
in means-tested entitlement programs, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 2, 575-604.
[46] Borjas G. & Trejo S. (1991) Immigrant participation in the welfare system, Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 44, 2, 195-211.
[47] Br￿cker H. & Jahn E. (2010) Migration and wage-setting: Reassessing the labor market
e⁄ects of migration, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[48] B￿chel F. & Frick J. (2005) Immigrants￿economic performance across Europe ￿Does
immigration policy matter?, Population Research and Policy Review, 24, 2, 175-212 (see
also EPAC Working Paper 42, University of Colchester).
[49] Butcher K. & DiNardo J. (2002) The immigrant and native-born wage distributions: Ev-
idence from the United States censuses, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56, 1,
97-121 (see also NBER Working Paper 6630).
[50] Card D. (1990) The impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labor market, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 43, 2, 245-257.
[51] Card D. (2001) Immigrant in￿ ows, native out￿ ows, and the local labor market impacts of
higher immigration, Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 1, 22-64.
28[52] Card D. (2005) Is the new immigration really so bad?, Economic Journal, 115, 507, F300-
323.
[53] Card D. and DiNardo J. (2000) Do immigrant in￿ ows lead to native out-￿ ows?, American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90, 2, 360-367.
[54] Card D. and Lewis E. (2007) The di⁄usion of Mexican immigrants during the 1990s:
Explanations and impacts, in Borjas G. (ed.) Mexican Immigration, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
[55] Carliner G. (1980) Wages, earnings and hours of ￿rst, second and third generation Amer-
ican males, Economic Inquiry, 18, 87-102.
[56] Carling J. (2008) The determinants of migrant remittances, Oxford Review of Economic
Policy, 24, 3, 581-598.
[57] Cervantes M. & Guellec D. (2002) The brain drain: Old myths, new realities, OECD
Observer, May 2002.
[58] Chiquiar D. & Hanson G. (2005) International migration, self-selection, and the distribu-
tion of wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States, Journal of Political Economy,
113, 2, 239-281.
[59] Chiswick B. (1978) The e⁄ect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men,
Journal of Political Economy, 86, 897-921.
[60] Chiswick B. (1986) Is the new immigration less skilled than the old?, Journal of Labor
Economics, 4, 2, 168-192.
[61] Chiswick B. (1991) Speaking, reading and earnings among low-skilled immigrants, Journal
of Labor Economics, 9, 2, 149-170.
[62] Chiswick B., Cohen Y. & Zach T. (1997) The labor market status of immigrants: E⁄ects
of unemployment rate at arrival and duration of residence, Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, 50, 2, 289-303.
[63] Chiswick B. & Miller P. (1988) Earnings in Canada: The roles of immigrant genera-
tion, French ethnicity and language, in Schulz P. (ed.) Research in Population Economics,
Greenwich, CT.
[64] Chiswick B. & Miller P. (1992) Language and the labor market: The immigrant experience
in Canada and the United States, in Chiswick B. (ed.) Immigration, Language and Ethnic
Issues: Canada and the United States, Washington DC.
[65] Chiswick B. & Miller P. (1995) The endogeneity between language and earnings: Interna-
tional analyses, Journal of Labor Economics, 13, 2, 246-288.
[66] Chiswick B. & Miller P. (2005) Do enclaves matter in immigrant adjustment?, City and
Community, 4, 1, 5-35 (see also IZA Discussion Paper 449).
[67] Clark K. & Drinkwater S. (2008) The labour-market performance of recent migrants,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 495-516.
[68] Coleman D. (1993) Contrasting age structures of Western Europe and of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union: Demographic curiosity of labor resource, Population and
Development Review, 19, 523-555.
29[69] Coleman D. (2008) The demographic e⁄ects of international migration in Europe, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 452-476.
[70] Constant A. & D￿ Agosto E. (2008) Where do the brainy Italians go?, AIEL Series in
Labour Economics 201, part 3, 247-271.
[71] Constant A. & Massey D. (2003) Self-selection, earnings, and out-migration: A longitudi-
nal study of immigrants to Germany, Journal of Population Economics, 16, 631-653.
[72] Constant A. & Massey D. (2005) Labor market segmentation and the earnings of Ger-
man guest workers, Population Research and Policy Review, 24, 5, 489-512 (see also IZA
Discussion Paper 774).
[73] Coppel J., Dumont J-C. & Visco I. (2001) Trends in immigration and economic conse-
quences, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 284.
[74] Cortes, P. (2008) The e⁄ect of low-skilled immigration on US prices: Evidence from CPI
data, Journal of Political Economy, 116, 3, 381-422.
[75] Crossley T., McDonald J. & Worswick C (2001) Immigrant bene￿t receipt revisited: Sen-
sitivity to the choice of survey years and model speci￿cation, Journal of Human Resources,
36, 2, 379-397.
[76] D￿ Amuri F., Ottaviano G. & Peri G. (2010) The labor market impact of immigration in
Western Germany in the 1990￿ s, European Economic Review, 54, 4, 550-570.
[77] DeNew J. & Zimmermann K. (1994a) Native wage impacts of foreign labor: A random
e⁄ects panel analysis, Journal of Population Economics, 7, 2, 177-192.
[78] DeNew J. & Zimmermann K. (1994b) Blue collar labor vulnerability: Wage impacts of
migration, in Steinmann G. & Urich R. (eds.) Economic Consequences of Immigration to
Germany, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg.
[79] Dolado J., Duce R. & Jimeno J. (1996) The e⁄ects of migration on the relative demand of
skilled versus unskilled labour: Evidence from Spain, CEPR Discussion Paper 1476.
[80] Drinkwater S., Levine P., Lotti E. & Pearlman J. (2007) The immigration surplus revisited
in a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth, Journal of Regional Science, 47,
3, 569-601.
[81] Dustmann C. (1994) Speaking ￿ uency, writing ￿ uency and earnings of migrants, Journal
of Population Economics, 7, 2, 133-156.
[82] Dustmann C. (1996) Return migration: The European experience, Economic Policy, 22,
215-250.
[83] Dustmann C. (2003) Return migration, wages di⁄erentials and the optimal migration du-
ration, European Economic Review, 47, 353-367.
[84] Dustmann C. & Fabbri F. (2003) Language pro￿ciency and labour market performance of
immigrants in the UK, Economic Journal, 113, 695-717.
[85] Dustmann C. & Glitz A. (2005) Immigration, jobs and wages: Theory, evidence and
opinion, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration, London.
[86] Dustmann C., Glitz A. & Frattini T. (2008) The labour market impacts of immigration,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 477-494.
30[87] Dustmann C. & van Soest A. (2002) Language and the earnings of immigrants, Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, 55, 3, 473-492.
[88] Dustmann C. & Weiss Y. (2007) Return migration: Theory and empirical evidence for the
UK, British Journal of Industrial Economics, 45, 2, 236-256.
[89] Edin P-A., Fredriksson P. & ¯slund O. (2003) Ethnic enclaves and the economic success
of immigrants: Evidence from a natural experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118,
329-357.
[90] Edin P-A., LaLonde R. & ¯slund O. (2000) Emigration of immigrants and measures of
immigrant assimilation: Evidence from Sweden, Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7, 163-
204.
[91] Ekberg J. (1991) Vad h￿nde sedan? En studie av utrikes f￿dda p￿ arbetsmarknaden,
ACTA Wexionesia, Serie 2, Economy and Politics, V￿xj￿.
[92] Ekberg J. (1994) Economic progress of immigrants in Sweden from 1970 to 1990: A lon-
gitudinal study, Scandinavian Journal of Social Welfare, 3, 148-157.
[93] Ekberg J. (1999) Immigration and the public sector: Income e⁄ects for the native popu-
lation in Sweden, Journal of Population Economics, 12, 3, 411-430.
[94] Eurostat (2002) Labour Force Survey.
[95] Eurostat (2003) Labour Force Survey.
[96] Eurostat (2006) EU Integration Seen Through Statistics.
[97] Eurostat (2008) Europa database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
[98] Eurostat (2009) Population and Social Conditions.
[99] Evans M. (1986) Sources of immigrants￿language pro￿ciency: Australian results with
comparison to Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, European
Sociological Review, 2, 3, 226-236.
[100] Faini R. & Venturini, A. (1993) Trade aid and migrations, some basic policy issues, Euro-
pean Economic Review, 37, 435-442.
[101] Feldstein M. (2006) The e⁄ects of the ageing European population on economic growth and
budgets: Implications for immigration and other policies, NBER Working Paper 12736.
[102] Fertig M. & Schmidt C. (2001) Aggregate-level migration studies as a tool for forecasting
future migration streams, in Djajic S. (ed.) International Migration: Trends, Policy and
Economic Impact, London/New York.
[103] Frattini T. (2008) Immigration and prices in the UK, Working Paper.
[104] Freeman R. (2006) People ￿ ows in globalization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 2,
145-170.
[105] Friedberg R. (2001) The impact of mass migration on the Israeli labor market, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111, 1373-1408.
[106] Friedberg R. & Hunt J. (1995) The impact of immigrants on host country wages, employ-
ment and growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 2, 23-44.
31[107] Funkhouser E. & Trejo S. (1995) The labor market skills of recent male immigrants: Ev-
idence from the Current Population Survey, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48,
792-811.
[108] Gang I. & Rivera-Batiz F. (1994) Labor market e⁄ects of immigration in the United
States and Europe: Substitution vs. complementarity, Journal of Population Economics,
7, 2, 157-175.
[109] Goldin C. (1994) The political economy of immigration restriction in the United States,
1890￿ 1921, in Goldin C. & Libecap G. (eds.) The Regulated Economy: A Historical Ap-
proach to Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[110] Gonzalez L. & Ortega F. (2009) Immigration and housing booms: Evidence from Spain,
IZA Working Paper 4333.
[111] Grant M. (1999) Evidence of new immigrant assimilation in Canada, Canadian Economic
Journal, 32, 930-955.
[112] Greenwood M. & Hunt G. (1995) Economic e⁄ects of immigrants on native and foreign-
born workers: Complementarity, substitutability, and other channels of in￿ uence, Southern
Economic Journal Literature, 61, 4, 1076-1097.
[113] Greenwood M. & McDowell J. (1986) The factor-market consequences of US immigration,
Journal of Economic Literature, 24, 4, 1738-1772.
[114] Gross D. (2002) Three million foreigners, three million unemployed? Immigration ￿ ows
and the labor market in France, Applied Economics, 34, 16, 1969-1983.
[115] Grossman J. (1982) The substitutability of natives and immigrants in production, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 64, 4, 596-603.
[116] Gustafsson B. & ￿sterberg T. (2001) Immigrants and the public sector budget ￿Account-
ing exercise for Sweden, Journal of Population Economics, 14, 689-708.
[117] Gustman A. & Steinmeier T. (2000) Social security bene￿ts of immigrants and the U.S.
born, in Borjas G. (ed.) Issues in the Economics of Immigration, The University of Chicago
Press.
[118] Hammarstedt M. (2003) Income from work among immigrants to Sweden, Review of In-
come and Wealth, 49, 2, 185-203.
[119] Hansen J. & Lofstrom M. (2003) Immigrant assimilation and welfare participation: Do
immigrants assimilate into or out-of welfare?, Journal of Human Resources, 38, 1, 74-98.
[120] Hatton T. & Williamson J. (1998) The Age of Mass Migration: Causes and Impacts,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[121] Hatzius J. (1994) The unemployment and earnings e⁄ect of German immigration, Univer-
sity of Oxford Applied Economics Preprints 165.
[122] Hu W-Y. (1998) Elderly immigrants on welfare, Journal of Human Resources, 33, 3, 711-
741.
[123] Huddle D. (1993) The Cost of Immigration, Rice University.
[124] Hunt J. (1992) The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor market,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 45, 556-572.
32[125] Hunt J. (2010) Which immigrants are most innovative and entrepreneurial? Distinctions
by entry visa, Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
[126] Hunt J. and Gauthier-Loiselle M. (2010) How much does immigration boost innovation?,
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2, 2, 31-56.
[127] Hunter R., Oswald A. & Charlton B. (2009) The elite brain drain, The Economic Journal,
119, F231￿ F251
[128] IOM (1991) Ninth IOM Seminar on Migration: North-South Migration, International
Migration 29.
[129] IOM (1998) Migration Potential in Central and Eastern Europe, International Organiza-
tion for Migration, Geneve.
[130] Jaeger D. (1996) Skill di⁄erences and the e⁄ect of immigrants on the wages of the natives,
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic Working Paper 273.
[131] Kahn S. & MacGarvie M. (2009) How important is location for research in science?, Work-
ing Paper.
[132] Kazemipur A. & Halli S. (2001) Immigrants and ￿new poverty￿ : The case of Canada,
International Migration Review, 35, 4, 1129-1156.
[133] Kerr W. (2007) The ethnic composition of US inventors, HBS Working Paper 08-006.
[134] Kerr W. (2008a) Ethnic scienti￿c communities and international technology di⁄usion, Re-
view of Economics and Statistics, 90, 3, 518-537.
[135] Kerr W. (2008b) The agglomeration of US ethnic invention, in Glaeser E. (ed.) Economics
of Agglomeration, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[136] Kerr W. & Lincoln W. (2010) The supply side of innovation: H-1B visas and US ethnic
invention, Journal of Labor Economics, 28, 3, 473-508.
[137] Knaap T., Bovenberg A., Bettendorf L. & Broer D. (2003) Vergrijzning, aanvuellende
pensionen en de Nederlandse economie, Ocfeb Studies in Economic Policy 7, Erasmus
Universiteit Rotterdam.
[138] Lach S. (2007) Immigration and prices, Journal of Political Economy, 115, 4, 548-587.
[139] LaLonde R. & Topel R. (1991) Immigrants in the American labor market: Quality, assim-
ilation, and distributional e⁄ects, American Economic Review, 81, 297-302.
[140] LaLonde R. & Topel R. (1992) The assimilation of immigrants in the U.S. labor market, in
Borjas G. & Freeman R. (eds.) Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences
for the United States and the Source Areas, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[141] Layard R., Blanchard O., Dornbusch R. & Krugman P. (1992) East-West Migration: The
Alternatives, MIT Press, Cambridge.
[142] Lee R. & Miller T. (2000) Immigration, social security and broader impacts, American
Economic Review, 90, 2, 350-354.
[143] Lewis E. (2010) Immigration, skill mix, and capital-skill complementarity, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, forthcoming.
33[144] Long L.H., Tucker C.J. & Urton, W.L. (1988) Migration distances, an international com-
parison, Demography, 25, 633-640.
[145] Longhi S., Nijkamp P. & Poot J. (2005) A meta-analytic assessment of the e⁄ects of
immigration on wages, Journal of Economic Surveys, 19, 3, 451-477.
[146] Longhi S., Nijkamp P. & Poot J. (2006) The impact of immigration on the employment of
natives in regional labour markets: A meta-analysis, IZA Working Paper 2044.
[147] Longhi S., Nijkamp P. & Poot J. (2008) Meta-analysis of empirical evidence on the la-
bor market impacts of immigration, Region et Developpement, 27, 161-190 (see also IZA
Working Paper 3418).
[148] Lubostky D. (2007) Chutes or ladders? A longitudinal study of immigrant earnings, Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 115, 5, 820-867.
[149] Lucas R.E.B. (1975) The supply of immigrants￿function and taxation of immigrants￿
incomes: An econometric analysis, Journal of Development Economics, 2, 289-308
[150] Lucas R.E.B. (2004) International migration regimes and economic development, draft
report to the Expert Group on Development Issues, Swedish Ministry for Foreign A⁄airs.
[151] Lucas R.E.B. (2005) International Migration and Economic Development, Edward Elgar,
Northampton, MA.
[152] Lundborg P. (2000) Vilka f￿rlorade jobbet under 1990-talet? V￿lf￿rdens f￿ruts￿ttningar.
Arbetsmarknad, demogra￿och segregation, in Fritzell J. (ed.) Kommitten V￿lf￿rdbokslut,
SOU 2000:37.
[153] Mandor⁄, M. (2007) Social networks, ethnicity, and occupation, Working Paper.
[154] Massey D., Hugo G., Taylor J., Arango J. & Kouaouci A. (1998) Worlds in Motion:
Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.
[155] McDonald J. & Worswick C. (1998) The earnings of immigrant men in Canada: Job tenure,
cohort e⁄ects and macroeconomic conditions, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51,
465-482.
[156] McManus W., Gould W. & Welch F. (1983) Earnings of Hispanic men: The role of English
language pro￿ciency, Journal of Labor Economics, 1, 2, 101-130.
[157] Moscarola F. (2003) Immigration ￿ ows and the sustainability of the Italian welfare state,
Politica Economica, 1, 63-90.
[158] M￿hleisen M. & Zimmermann K. (1994) A panel analysis of job changes and unemploy-
ment, European Economic Review, 38, 3, 793-801.
[159] Munshi K. (2003) Networks in the modern economy: Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor
market, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 2, 549-599.
[160] Nakamura A. & Nakamura M. (1994) Wage rates of immigrant men in Canada and the
United States, in Chiswick B. (ed.) Immigration, Language and Ethnicity: Canada and
the United States, American Enterprise Institute, Washington.
34[161] Nekby L. (2002) How long does it take to integrate? Employment convergence of im-
migrants and natives in Sweden, Trade Union Institute for Economic Research Working
Paper 185.
[162] OECD (1998) SOPEMI ￿Trends in International Migration: Annual Report, Paris.
[163] OECD (1999) Trends in International Migration, Annual Report, 1999 Edition, Paris,
OECD.
[164] OECD (2000) Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences, chapter VII, OECD
Economic Outlook 68.
[165] OECD (2002) International Mobility of the Highly Skilled, Paris.
[166] OECD (2003) SOPEMI ￿Trends in International Migration: Annual Report, Paris.
[167] Okkerse L. (2008) How to measure labour market e⁄ects of immigration: A review, Journal
of Economic Surveys, 22, 1, 1-30.
[168] Ottaviano P. & Peri G. (2008) Immigration and national wages: Clarifying the theory and
the empirics, Working Paper.
[169] Ottaviano P. & Peri G. (2010) Rethinking the e⁄ects of immigration on wages, Journal of
the European Economic Association, forthcoming (see also NBER Working Paper 12497).
[170] Partridge M., Rickman D. & Ali K. (2008) Recent immigration and economic outcomes in
rural America, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 90, 5 1326-1333.
[171] Passel J. & Clark R. (1994) How much do immigrants really cost? A reappraisal of Huddle￿ s
￿ The cost of immigrants￿ , Urban Institute Working Paper.
[172] Peri G. (2007a) Immigrants￿complementarities and native wages: Evidence from Califor-
nia, NBER Working Paper 12956.
[173] Peri G. (2007b) Higher education, innovation and growth, in Brunello G., Garibaldi P. and
Wasmer E. (eds.) Education and Training in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[174] Pischke J. & Velling J. (1994) Wage and employment e⁄ects of immigration to Germany
￿An analysis based on local labor markets, CEPR Discussion Paper 935.
[175] Pischke J. & Velling J. (1997) Employment e⁄ects of immigration to Germany ￿An analysis
based on local labor markets, Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 4, 594-604.
[176] Pope D. & Withers G. (1993) Do migrants rob jobs? Lessons from Australian history,
1861-1991, Journal of Economic History, 53, 719-742.
[177] Robinson C. (1988) Language and choice: The distribution of language skills and earnings
in a dual language economy, Research in Labor Economics, 9, 53-90.
[178] Roodenburg H., Euwals R. & ter Rele H. (2003) Immigration and the Dutch economy,
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis.
[179] Rowthorn R. (2008) The ￿scal impacts of immigration on advanced economies, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 560-580.
[180] Ruhs M. (2008) Economic research and labour immigration policy, Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, 24, 3, 403-426.
35[181] Saint-Paul G. (2004) The brain drain: Some evidence from European expatriates in the
United States, IZA Working Paper 1310.
[182] Saiz A. (2003) Room in the kitchen for the melting pot: Immigration and rental prices,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 3, 502-521.
[183] Saiz A. (2007) Immigration and housing rents in American cities, Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics, 61, 2, 345-371.
[184] Saiz A. & Wachter S. (2010) Immigration and the neighborhood, American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming.
[185] Sarvim￿ki M. (2010) Assimilation to a welfare state: Labor market performance and use of
social bene￿ts by immigrants to Finland, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[186] Schoeni R. (1997) New evidence on the economic progress of foreign-born men in the 1970s
and 1980s, Journal of Human Resources, 32, 683-740.
[187] Schoeni R. (1998) Labor market assimilation of immigrant women, Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 51, 3, 483-504.
[188] Schoeni R., McCarthy K. & Vernez G. (1996) The Mixed Economic Progress of Immigrants,
MR-763, RAND Corporation.
[189] Sinn H. & Werding M. (2001) Immigration following the EU eastern enlargement, CESifo
Forum, Summer 2001, 40-47.
[190] Smith J. & Edmonton B. (1997) (eds.) The New Americans: Economic, Demographic and
Fiscal E⁄ects of Immigration, National Academic Press, Washington D.C.
[191] Stephan P. & Levin S. (2001) Exceptional contributions to US science by the foreign-born
and foreign-educated, Population Research and Policy Review, 20, 1-2, 59-79.
[192] Storesletten K. (2000) Sustaining ￿scal policy through immigration, Journal of Political
Economy, 108, 2, 300-323.
[193] Storesletten K. (2003) Fiscal implications of immigration ￿a net present value approach,
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105, 3, 487-506.
[194] Straubhaar T. (1986) The determinants of workers￿ remittances: The case of Turkey,
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 122, 4, 728-740.
[195] Tainer E. (1988) English language pro￿ciency and earnings among foreign-born men, Jour-
nal of Human Resources, 23, 1, 108-122.
[196] Tienda M. & Jensen L. (1986) Immigration and public assistance participation: Dispelling
the myth of dependency, Social Science Research, 15, 4, 372-400.
[197] UN (2000) Replacement migration: Is it a solution to declining and ageing populations?
Technical report, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social A⁄airs, Population
Division, New York.
[198] UN (2002) International Migration, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social
A⁄airs, Population Division, New York.
[199] US Census Bureau (2000a) The Foreign Born Population in the United States.
36[200] US Census Bureau (2000b) Census Brief: Coming to America: A Pro￿le of the Nation￿ s
Foreign Born.
[201] Velling J. (1995) Immigration und Arbeitsmarkt: Eine Empirische Analyse f￿r die Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland, Nomos, Baden-Baden.
[202] Vilhelmsson R. (2000) Ethnic di⁄erences in the Swedish youth labor market, Licentiatse-
rien 15/2000, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
[203] Wadensj￿ E. (1997) Invandrarkvinnornas arbetsmarknad, SOU 1997: 137, 195-212.
[204] Warren R. & Peck J. (1980) Foreign-born emigration from the United States: 1960￿ 1970,
Demography, 17, 1, 71-84.
[205] Winkelmann R. & Zimmermann K. (1993) Ageing, migration and labour mobility, in
Johnson P. & Zimmermann K. (eds.) Labour Markets in an Ageing Europe, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
[206] Winter-Ebmer R. & Zimmermann K. (1998) East-West trade and migration: The Austro-
German case, IZA Working Paper 2.
[207] Winter-Ebmer R. & Zweim￿ller J. (1996) Immigration and the earnings of young native
workers, Oxford Economic Papers, 48, 3, 473-491.
[208] Winter-Ebmer R. & Zweim￿ller J. (1997) Immigration, trade, and Austrian unemployment,
in Landesmann M. & Streissler E. (eds.) Unemployment in Europe, MacMillan, London.
[209] Yuengert A. (1994) Immigrant earnings relative to what? Importance of earnings function
speci￿cation and comparison points, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 9, 71-90.
[210] Zaiceva A. and Zimmermann K. (2008) Scale, diversity, and determinants of labour mi-
gration in Europe, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24, 3, 427-451.
[211] Zimmermann K. (1994) European migration: Push and pull, in Proceedings of the World
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Supplement to the World Economic
Review and the World Bank Research Observer.
[212] Zimmermann K. (1995) Tackling the European migration problem, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9, 2, 45-62.
[213] Zorlu A. & Hartog J. (2005) The e⁄ect of immigration on wages in three European coun-
tries, Journal of Population Economics, 18, 1, 113-151.
37 
    Source: Eurostat (2006). 
 












1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Fig. 1: Components of EU-25's Population Change
Net migration including corrections Natural increase (life births - deaths)
Fig. 2:  Discounted Net Value of Immigration in the US


























Educated Migrates with family No return migrationForeign Total Foreign EU25 Foreign 2002 2001
National National National Refugees Foreign Share
Population Population  Population  Percent of  Per Thousand and Asylum Primary & Tertiary or Tertiary
Country 2007 Share 2007 Share 2007 Migrants Population Seekers Secondary and Above Enrollments
Austria 826,013 10.0% 3.0% 2.5% 0.89 43,624 7.5% 3.9% 12.0%
Belgium 932,161 8.8% 5.8% 2.8% 2.41 32,425 n.a. n.a. 10.6%
Denmark 278,096 5.1% 1.4% 2.5% 1.22 79,665 3.3% 4.2% 6.5%
Finland 121,739 2.3% 0.8% 1.7% 0.32 15,816 1.1% 1.3% 2.3%
France 3,650,100 5.8% 2.0% 1.2% 1.18 136,770 3.7% 4.8% 7.3%
Germany 7,255,949 8.8% 2.9% 1.1% 0.83 953,000 8.1% 5.1% 9.5%
Greece 887,600 7.9% 0.8% 0.2% 0.09 4,526 7.1% 6.0% n.a
Ireland 452,300 10.5% 6.8% 0.4% 0.28 12,347 5.1% 11.0% 4.9%
Italy 2,938,922 5.0% 0.4% 0.5% 0.14 15,852 2.0% 3.6% 1.6%
Luxembourg 198,213 41.6% 35.9% 0.4% 1.37 2,244 33.4% 46.3% n.a
Netherlands 681,932 4.2% 1.5% 3.7% 3.19 206,521 4.2% 4.1% 3.3%
Portugal 434,887 4.1% 0.8% 0.2% 0.04 707 2.1% 3.5% 1.6%
Spain 4,606,474 10.4% 2.4% 0.9% 0.22 13,089 3.7% 4.7% 2.2%
Sweden 491,996 5.4% 2.4% 3.6% 3.64 175,209 4.8% 5.9% 7.3%
United Kingdom 3,659,900 6.0% 2.3% 1.2% 0.80 200,036 7.3% 16.1% 10.9%
EU15 Sum 27,416,282 1,891,831
EU15 Unwtd Mean 6.7% 2.4% 1.6% 1.09 4.6% 5.7% 6.2%
EU15 Wtd Mean 7.0% 2.1% 1.2% 0.87 5.2% 6.5% 6.6%
United States 18,600,000 6.6% n.a. 1.9% 1.98 878,488 7.3% 5.9% 3.5%
Notes:  EU15 Unwtd Mean excludes Luxembourg.  US population data refer to 2000.  Data taken from Eurostat (2008), Lucas (2005), and the 2000 US Census IPUMS.
Table 1:  European Migration Patterns
of Educated Workers
2001 Foreign National Share 1990s Annual Rate of
Citizenship AcquisitionHost Country Immigrant Immigrant Host Country Immigrant Immigrant Host Country Immigrant Immigrant
- Source Country Flow Population - Source Country Flow Population - Source Country Flow Population
Australia Finland Norway
  New Zealand 22% 8%   Russia 30% 24%   Sweden 22% 11%
  United Kingdom 10% 27%   Sweden 10% 9%   Denmark 8% 12%
  China 7% 3%   Estonia 8% 12%   Great Britain 5% 7%
  South Africa 6% 1%   Somalia 4% 7%   Germany 4% 3%
  Philippines 4% 2%   Iraq 3% 3%   Somalia 4% -
Belgium France Sweden
  France 15% 12%   Algeria 14% 16%   Iraq 15% 5%
  Netherlands 12% 9%   Morocco 14% 17%   Finland 8% 18%
  Morocco 9% 15%   Turkey 6% 5%   Yugoslavia 5% 6%
  Germany 6% 4%   China 5% 0%   Norway 5% 6%
  United States 6% 1%   Tunisia 5% 6%   Iran 4% 5%
Canada Germany United States
  China 11% 5%   Poland 11% 4%   Mexico 20% 22%
  India 9% 5%   Yugoslavia 10% 10%   China 6% 3%
  Philippines 5% 4%   Turkey 8% 29%   India 6% 2%
  Hong Kong 5% 5%   Italy 6% 8%   Philippines 5% 5%
  Pakistan 5% -   Russia 5% 2%   Dom. Republic 3% 2%
Denmark Netherlands Japan
  Somalia 9% 4%   Morocco 7% 20%   China 21% 17%
  Yugoslavia 7% 14%   Turkey 6% 17%   Philippines 18% 6%
  Iraq 6% 3%   Germany 6% 8%   United States 10% 3%
  Germany 6% 5%   United Kingdom 6% 6%   Brazil 8% 16%
  Norway 5% 5%   United States 4% 2%   Korea 6% 44%
Sources:  Coppel et al. (2001).  Immigrant flows refer to 1998 except for Australia and Denmark (1999).  Immigrant stocks refer to 1997 except for Australia, 
Canada, and Denmark (1996).  Immigrant populations refer to foreign-born population for Australia, Canada, and the US.
Table 2:  Primary Source Countries of OECD Immigration, 1997-1998Study Country Year (Cohort) Wage Difference
Constant & Massey (2005) Germany 1984-97 (-1997) -13%
Ekberg (1994) Sweden 1970-90 (-1970) -2%
Edin et al. (2000) Sweden 1970 (1965-70) -12%
2000 (1995-2000) -46%
Arai & Vilhelmsson (2004) Sweden 1991 (Nordic, -1991) ±0%
1991 (Europe, -1991) -3%
1991 (Other, -1991) -7%
Hammarstedt (2003) Sweden 1990 -43% to +11%
Bell (1997) Great Britain 1973-92 (-1989) -34% to +31%
Büchel & Frick (2005) Spain 1994-97 +4%
Ireland 1994-97 +12%






LaLonde & Topel (1991) USA 1970 (1965-69) -20%
1980 (1965-69) -14%
1980 (1975-79) -35%
Yuengert (1994) USA 1980 (1965-69) -26% to +82%
Borjas (1994) USA 1990 (1985-89) -30%
Funkhouser & Trejo (1995) USA 1989 (1985-89) -30%
Card (2001) USA 1990 (-1984) -6%
1990 (1985-90) -29%
Butcher & DiNardo (2002) USA 1990 (-1989) -10%
Blau et al. (2003) USA 1980 (1975-79) -15%
Borjas (1993) Canada 1980 (1975-80) -16%
Grant (1999) Canada 1981-91 (1976-90) -30% to +7%
Table 3:  Survey of Immigrant-Native Wage Differences
Sources:  Reported studies.  Estimates were calculated using sample averages reported in the studies.  Wage 
differences are reported as mean or maximum–minimum differences for various immigrant groups.  Differences 
do not control for immigrant observable characteristics in most cases.
B. North American Studies
A. European StudiesMales Males Females Females
Arriving Arriving Arriving Arriving
Country 1995-99 Pre-1995 1995-99 Pre-1995 Natives Immigrants
Denmark 0.75 0.84 0.42 0.81 6% 13%
Finland 0.90 0.95 0.67 0.87 15% 17%
France 0.77 0.99 0.45 0.78 12% 19%
Germany 0.86 0.98 0.67 0.91 8% 17%
Great Britain 0.79 0.96 0.61 0.84 8% 12%
Netherlands 0.62 0.87 0.55 0.79 5% 15%
Norway 0.84 0.85 0.58 0.80 5% 9%
Sweden 0.70 0.91 0.49 0.81 8% 23%
Sources: Angrist and Kugler (2003).  Relative participation rates are calculated as the ratios of non-EU immigrant to native 
participation rates.  Participation rates are the labor force divided by the working-age population.  European figures are derived 
from Eurostat labour force surveys (LFS).  LFS estimates differ substantially from actual employment for Finland due to small 
LFS sample sizes.
Table 4:  Immigrant-Native Participation and Unemployment Rates, 1995-1999
Relative Participation Rate of non-EU Immigrants to Natives
Overall
Unemployment RateStudy Country Measure Year (Cohort) Percentage Difference
Arai & Vilhelmsson (2004) Sweden Unemployment 1992-95 (1968-91) Non-EU: +69% to +101%
EU: +17% to +34%
Nordic: +9% to +23%
Nekby (2002) Sweden Employment 1990-2000 (1946-99) Men: -32%
Women: -30%
Roodenburg et al. (2003) Netherlands Employment 2000 Western Countries: -4%
Non-Western: -18%
Sarvimäki (2010) Finland Employment 1993-2003 (1970-98) Men non-OECD: -12% to -9%
Men OECD: -18% to -15%
Women non-OECD: -9% to -4%
Women OECD: -13% to -9%
Ekberg (1991) Sweden Employment 1989 -17%
Card (2001) USA Employment 1989 (Pre-1986) -3%
1989 (1986-89) -16%
Table 5:  Survey of Immigrant-Native Employment Heterogeneity
Sources:  Reported studies.Percentage of
Study Country Year Wage Elasticity
DeNew & Zimmermann (1994a) Germany 1984-89 -0.16
DeNew & Zimmermann (1994b) Germany 1984-89 -0.35 (-0.54 to +0.12)
Bauer (1997) Germany 1994 +0.082
Bauer (1998) Germany 1994 -0.021 to +0.035
Pischke & Velling (1994) Germany 1985-89 ±0 (+0.033)
Hatzius (1994) Germany 1984-91 -0.058 to ±0
Brucker & Jahn (2010) Germany 1975-2004 -0.1
Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller (1996) Austria 1988-91 regional +0.037
industry +0.01
Winter-Ebmer & Zimmermann (1998) Germany ±0 to +0.01
Austria -0.16 to ±0 
Gang & Rivera-Batiz (1994) Netherlands 1986-89 -0.09 to + 0.02
Great Britain -0.08 to +0.02
France -0.11 to -0.01
Germany -0.05 to +0.11
Zorlu & Hartog (2005) Netherlands 1998 -0.04 to +0.02
Great Britain 1997-98 -0.036 to +0.056
Norway 1996 -0.063 to +0.180
Hunt (1992) France 1968 -0.08 to -0.14
Dolado et al. (1996) Spain +0.02 to +0.04
Grossman (1982) USA 1970 -0.1
Card (2001) USA 1989 -0.04 to -0.01
Goldin (1994) USA 1890-1921 -1.6 to -1.0
LaLonde & Topel (1991) USA 1970, -80 -0.6 to -0.1
Borjas, Freeman, & Katz (1992) USA 1967-1987 -1.2
Altonji & Card (1991) USA 1970, -80 -0.86, -1.2
Borjas (2003) USA 1960-2001 -0.4 to -0.3
Pope & Withers (1993) Australia 1881-1981 ±0
Friedberg (2001) Israel 1994 +0.03
Table 6:  Survey of Immigration's Wage Effect for Natives
Sources:  Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), reported studies.  Table shows elasticity of 
wages with respect to a one percent increase in the share of immigrants in labor force (or population). 
B. North American and Other Studies
A.  European StudiesStudy Country Year Employment Effect
Winkelmann & Zimmermann (1993) Germany 1974-84 Small negative employment effect
Mühleisen & Zimmermann (1994) Germany 1982-89 None
Pischke & Velling (1997) Germany 1986-89 Employment +2%
Unemployment ±0%
Hatzius (1994) Germany None
Brucker & Jahn (2010) Germany 1975-2004 Unemployment +0.1%
Velling (1995) Germany 1988-93 Employment rate +0.24%
Gang & Rivera-Batiz (1994) Germany 1988 None
Winter-Ebmer & Zweimüller (1997) Austria 1988-91 None
Winter-Ebmer & Zimmermann (1998) Austria Employment -0.1%
Germany Small negative employment effect
Dolado et al. (1996) Spain Negative employment effect
Hunt (1992) France 1968 Unemployment +0.2%
Gross (2002) France 1975-95 Unemployment rate -0.16%
Angrist & Kugler (2003) EEA 1983-99 Employment -0.07% to -0.02%
Card (2001) USA 1989 Employment -0.12%
Altonji & Card (1991) USA 1980 Employment rate -0.23%
Friedberg (2001) Israel 1994 Employment -0.16%
Table 7:  Survey of Immigration's Employment Effect for Natives
Sources:  Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), reported studies.  Table shows change in native 
employment or unemployment due to a one percent increase in immigrants’ share of population or labor force unless otherwise 
stated.
A.  European Studies
B.  North American and Other StudiesCountry, Difference in Probability Assimilation: 
Study Benefit Type Year of Benefit Use Into or Out of?
Blume & Verner (2007) Denmark 1984-99 1990:  +56% to +300% Out of
All income transfers 1999:  +57% to +315%
Hansen & Lofstrom (2003) Sweden 1990-96 1990:  +160% to +418% Out of
1996:  +117% to +583%
Borjas & Trejo (1991) USA 1970 1970:  -3% Into
1980 1980:  +10%
Hu (1998) USA 1980 1980:  +36% Into, but refugees out of
Social security 1990 1990:  +26%
Borjas (1995b) USA 1970 1970:  -2% Into, but not for refugees
1980 1980:  +10%
1990 1990:  +20%
Gustman & Steinmeier (2000) USA 1992 Men:  -9%
All types of support Women:  +74%
Baker & Benjamin (1995) Canada 1985 1985:  -44% to -16% Into
Unemployment benefit 1990 1990:  -36% to +7%
Canada 1985:  -66% to -29% Into
Social security 1990:  -46% to +11%
Canada 1985:  -32% to +77% Out of
Housing support 1990:  -56% to +51%
Table 8:  Survey of Immigrants and Social Benefits
Sources:  Reported studies.  Blume & Verner (2007) examined welfare dependence.  Rate of dependence calculated as percentage of income from 
social security transfers.
A. European Studies
B. North American Studies